{"id":684,"date":"2026-07-24T14:06:21","date_gmt":"2026-07-24T14:06:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/?p=684"},"modified":"2026-07-27T17:48:56","modified_gmt":"2026-07-27T17:48:56","slug":"684","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/?p=684","title":{"rendered":"An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution"},"content":{"rendered":"

An Examination\u00a0Into\u00a0the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution Proposed by the Late Convention Held at Philadelphia: With Answers to the\u00a0Principal Objections\u00a0That Have Been Raised Against the System.<\/b><\/h3>\n

by Noah Webster (original attribution: “By A Citizen of America,”\u00a0 Oct 17, 1787)<\/p>\n

Of all the memorable eras that have marked the progress of men from the savage state to the refinements of luxury, that which has combined them into society, under a wise system of government, and given form to a nation, has ever been recorded and celebrated as the most important. Legislators have ever been\u00a0deemed\u00a0the greatest benefactors of\u00a0mankind\u2014respected when\u00a0living, and\u00a0often deified after their death. Hence the fame of\u00a0Fohi\u00a0and Confucius\u2014of Moses, Solon and Lycurgus\u2014of Romulus and Numa\u2014of Alfred, Peter the Great, and Mango Capac; whose names will be celebrated through all ages, for framing and improving constitutions of government, which introduced order into society and secured the benefits of law to millions of the human race.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This western world now beholds an era important beyond conception, and which posterity will number with the age of Czar of Muscovy, and with the promulgation of the Jewish laws at Mount Sinai. The names of those men who have digested a system of constitutions for the American empire, will be enrolled with those of Zamolxis and Odin, and celebrated by posterity with the honors which less enlightened nations have paid to the fabled demi-gods of antiquity.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But the origin of the AMERICAN REPUBLIC is distinguished by peculiar circumstances. Other nations have been driven together by fear and necessity\u2014the governments have\u00a0generally been\u00a0the result of a single man\u2019s observations; or the offspring of\u00a0particular interests. IN the formation of our constitution, the wisdom of all ages is collected\u2014the legislators of antiquity are consulted\u2014as well as the opinions and interests of the millions who are concerned. In short, in\u00a0it\u202f<\/span>an\u00a0empire of reason<\/span><\/i>.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In the formation of such a government, it is not only the\u202f<\/span>right<\/span><\/i>, but the\u00a0indispensible\u202f<\/span>duty<\/span><\/i>\u202fof every citizen to examine the principles of it, to compare them with the principles of other governments, with a constant eye to our particular situation and circumstances, and thus endeavor to foresee the future operations of our own system, and its effects upon human happiness.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Convinced of this truth, I have no apology to\u00a0offer for\u00a0the following remarks, but an earnest desire to be useful to my country.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In\u00a0attending to\u00a0the proposed Federal Constitution, the first thing that presents itself to our consideration, is the division of the legislative into two branches. This article has so many advocates in America, that it needs not any\u00a0vindication.\u2014But it has its opposers, among whom are some respectable characters, especially in Pennsylvania; for which reason, I will state some of the arguments and facts which incline me to favor the proposed division.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

On the first view of men in society, we should suppose that no man would be bound by a law to which he had not given his consent. Such would be our first idea of political obligation. But experience, from time immemorial, has proved it to be impossible to unite the opinions of all the members of a community, in every case; and hence the doctrine, that the opinions of a\u202f<\/span>majority<\/span><\/i>\u202fmust give law to the\u202f<\/span>whole State<\/span><\/i>: a doctrine as universally received, as any intuitive truth.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Another idea that naturally presents itself to our minds, on a slight consideration of the subject, is, that in a perfect government, all the members of a society should be present, and each give his suffrage in acts of legislation, by which he is to be bound. This is impracticable in large states; and even\u00a0were\u00a0it not, it is very questionable whether it would be the\u202f<\/span>best<\/span><\/i>\u202fmode of legislation. It was however\u00a0practised\u00a0in the free states of\u00a0antiquity;\u00a0and was the cause of innumerable evils. To avoid these evils,\u00a0the moderns\u00a0have invented the doctrine of\u202f<\/span>representation<\/span><\/i>, which\u00a0seems to be\u00a0the perfection of\u00a0human\u00a0government.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Another idea, which is very natural,\u00a0is,\u00a0that to complete the mode of legislation, all the representatives should be collected into\u202f<\/span>one body<\/span><\/i>, for the purpose of debating questions and enacting laws. Speculation would suggest the idea; and the desire of\u00a0improving upon\u00a0the systems of government in the old world, would\u00a0operate\u00a0powerfully in its favor.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But men are ever running into extremes. The passions, after a violent constraint, are apt to run into licentiousness; and even the reason of men, who have experienced evils from the\u202f<\/span>defects<\/span><\/i>\u202fof a government, will sometimes coolly condemn the\u202f<\/span>whole system<\/span><\/i>.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Every person, moderately acquainted with human nature, knows that public bodies, as well as individuals, are liable to the influence of sudden and violent passions, under the operation of which, the voice of reason is silenced. Instances of such influence are not so frequent, as in individuals; but its effects are extensive in proportion to the numbers that compose the public body. This fact suggests the expediency of dividing the powers of legislation between the two bodies of men, whose debates shall be separate and not dependent on each other: that, is at any time, one part should appear to be under any undue influence, either from passion, obstinacy, jealousy of particular men, attachment to a popular speaker, or other extraordinary causes, there might be a power in the legislature sufficient to check every pernicious measure. Even in a small republic, composed of men,\u00a0equal in property and abilities, and all meeting for the purpose of making laws, like the old Romans in the field of Mars, a division of the body into two independent branches, would be a necessary step to prevent the disorders, which arise from the pride, irritability and stubbornness of mankind. This will ever be the case, while men\u00a0possess\u00a0passions, easily inflamed, which may bias their reason and lead them to\u00a0erroneous\u00a0conclusions.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Another consideration has weight: A single body of men may be led astray by one person of abilities and address, who, on the first starting [of] a proposition, may throw a plausible appearance on one side of the question, and give a lead to the whole debate. To prevent any ill consequence from such a circumstance, a separate discussion, before a different body of men, and taken up on new grounds, is a very eligible expedient.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Besides, the design of a senate is not merely to check the legislative assembly, but to collect wisdom and experience. In most of our constitutions, and particularly in the proposed federal system, greater age and longer residence are\u00a0required\u00a0to qualify for the senate, than for the house of representatives. This is a wise provision. The house of representatives may be composed of new and\u00a0unexperienced\u00a0members\u2014strangers to the forms of proceeding, and the science of legislation. But either positive institutions, or customs, which may supply their place, fill the senate with men venerable for age and respectability, experienced in the ways of men, and in the art of governing, and who are not liable to the bias of passions that govern the young. If the senate of Rhode Island is an exception to this observation, it is a proof that the mass of the people are corrupted, and that the senate should be elected less frequently than the other house: Had the old senate in Rhode Island held their seats for three years; had they not been chosen, amidst a popular rage for paper money, the honor of that state would probably have been saved. The old senate would have stopped the measure for a year or two, till the people could have had time to deliberate upon its consequences. I consider it as a capital excellence of the proposed constitution, that the senate can be\u00a0wholly renewed\u00a0but once in six years.<\/span><\/p>\n

Experience is the best instructor\u2014it is better than a thousand theories. The history of every government on earth affords proof of the utility of different branches in a legislature. But I appeal only to our own experience in America. To what cause can we ascribe the absurd measures of Congress, in times past, and the speedy\u00a0recision\u00a0of whole measures, but to the want of some check? I feel the most profound deference for that honorable body, and perfect respect for their opinions; but some of their steps betray a great want of consideration\u2014a defect, which\u00a0perhaps nothing\u00a0can remedy, but a division of their deliberations. I will instance only their\u202f<\/span>resolution<\/span><\/i>\u202fto build a\u202f<\/span>Federal Town<\/span><\/i>. When we were involved in a debt, of which we could hardly pay the interest, and when Congress could not command a shilling, the very proposition was extremely absurd. Congress themselves\u00a0became ashamed of the\u00a0resolution, and\u00a0rescinded it with as much silence as possible. Many other acts of that body are equally reprehensible\u2014but respect forbids me to mention them.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Several states, since the war, have experienced the necessity of a division of the legislature. Maryland was saved from a most pernicious measure, by her senate. A rage for paper money,\u00a0bordering on madness, prevailed in their house of delegated\u2014an emission of \u00a3.500,000 was proposed; a sum equal to the circulating medium of the State. Had the sum been emitted, every shilling of\u00a0specie\u00a0would have been driven from circulation, and most of it from the state. Such a loss would not have been repaired in seven years\u2014not to mention the whole catalogue of frauds which would have followed the measure. The senate, like honest, judicious men, and the protectors of the interests of the state, firmly resisted the rage, and gave the people time to cool and to think. Their resistance was effectual\u2014the people acquiesced, and the honor and interest of the state were secured.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The house of representatives in Connecticut, soon after the war, had taken offence at a certain act of Congress. The upper house, who understood the necessity and expediency of the measure, better than the people, refused to concur in a remonstrance to Congress. Several other circumstances gave umbrage to the lower house; and to weaken or destroy the influence of the senate, the representatives, among other violent proceedings, resolved, not merely to remove the seat of government, but to make every county town in the state the seat of government, by rotation. This foolish resolution would have disgraced school-boys\u2014the senate saved the honor of the state, by rejecting it with disdain\u2014and within two months, every representative was ashamed of the conduct of the house. All public bodies have these fits of passion, when their conduct\u00a0seems to be\u00a0perfectly boyish; and in these\u00a0paroxisms, a check is highly necessary.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Pennsylvania\u00a0exhibits\u00a0many instances of this hasty conduct. At one session of the legislature, an armed force is ordered, by a precipitate resolution, to expel the settlers at\u00a0Wioming\u00a0from their possessions\u2014at a succeeding\u00a0session,\u00a0the same people are confirmed in their possessions. At one session, a charter is wrested from a corporation\u2014at another, restored. The whole state is split into parties\u2014everything is decided by party\u2014any proposition from one side of the house, is sure to be damned by the other\u2014and when one party perceives the other has the advantage, they play truant\u2014and an officer or a mob hunt the absconding members in all the streets and alleys in town. Such farces have been repeated in Philadelphia\u2014and\u202f<\/span>there alone<\/span><\/i>. Had the legislature been framed with some check upon rash proceedings, the honor of the state would have been saved\u2014the party spirit would have died with the measures proposed in the legislature. But now, any\u00a0measure may be carried by party in the house; it then becomes a\u00a0law, and\u00a0sows\u00a0the seeds of dissension throughout the state.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

A thousand\u00a0exampled\u00a0similar to the foregoing may be produced, both in ancient and modern history. Many plausible things may be said in favor of pure democracy\u2014many in favor of uniting the representatives of the people in one single house\u2014but uniform experience proved both to be inconsistent with the peace of society, and the rights of freemen.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The state of Georgia has already discovered such inconveniences in its constitution, that a proposition has been made for altering it; and there is a prospect that a revisal will take place.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

People who have heard and read of the European governments, founded on the different ranks of\u202f<\/span>monarch, nobility and people<\/span><\/i>, see, to view the\u202f<\/span>senate<\/span><\/i>\u202fin America, where there is no difference of ranks and titles, as a useless branch\u2014or as a servile imitation of foreign constitutions of government, without the same reasons. This is a capital mistake. Our senates, it is true, are not composed of a different order of men; but the same reasons, the same necessity for distinct branches of the legislature exists in all governments. But in most of our American constitutions, we have all the advantages of checks and balance, without the danger which may arise from a superior and independent order of men.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It is worth our while to institute a brief comparison between our American forms of government, and the two\u202f<\/span>best constitutions<\/span><\/i>\u202fthat ever existed in Europe, the\u202f<\/span>Roman<\/span><\/i>\u202fand the\u202f<\/span>British<\/span><\/i>.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In England, the king or supreme executive\u00a0officer,\u00a0is hereditary. In America, the president of the United States, is elective. That this is an advantage will hardly be disputed.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In ancient Rome, the king was elective, and so were the consuls, who were the executive officers in the republic. But they were\u00a0elected\u00a0by the body of the people, in their public assemblies; and this circumstance paved the way for such excessive bribery and corruption as are\u00a0wholly unknown\u00a0in modern times. The president of the United States is also elective; but by a few men\u2014chosen by the several legislatures\u2014under their inspection\u2014separated at a vast distance\u2014and holding no office under the United States. Such a mode of election almost precludes the possibility of corruption. Besides, no state however large, has the power, of\u00a0chusing\u00a0a president in that state; for each elector must choose at least one man, who is not an inhabitant of that State to which he belongs.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The crown of England is hereditary\u2014the consuls of Rome were chosen annually\u2014both these extremes are guarded against in our proposed constitution. The president is not dismissed from his office, as soon as he is acquainted with business\u2014he continues four\u00a0years, and is re-eligible, if the people approve his conduct. Nor can he\u00a0canvass for\u00a0his office, by reason of the distance of the electors; and the pride and jealousy of the states will prevent\u00a0his\u00a0continuing too long in office.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The age requisite to qualify for this office is thirty-five years.\u00a0The age requisite for admittance to the Roman consulship was forty-three years.\u00a0For this difference, good reasons may be assigned\u2014the improvements in science, and particularly in government, render it practicable for a man to qualify himself for an important office, much earlier in life, than he could among the Romans; especially in the early part of their commonwealth, when the office was instituted.\u00a0Besides\u00a0it is very questionable whether any inconvenience would have attended admission to the consulship at an earlier age.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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\nThe powers vested in the president resemble the powers of the supreme magistrates in Rome. They are not so extensive as those of the British king; but in one instance, the president, with concurrence of the senate, has powers exceeding those of the Roman consuls; I mean in the appointment of judges and other subordinate executive officers. The praetors of judges in Rome were chosen annually by the people. This was a defect in the Roman government. One half the evils in a state arise from a lax execution of the laws; and it is impossible that an executive officer can act with vigor and impartiality, when his office depends on the popular voice. An annual popular election of executive officers is the sure source of a negligent,\u00a0partial\u00a0and corrupt administration. The independence of the judges in England has produced a course of the most just,\u00a0impartial\u00a0and energetic judicial decisions, for many centuries, that can be\u00a0exhibited\u00a0in any nation on earth. In this point therefore I conceive the plan\u00a0propose\u00a0din America to be an improvement on the Roman constitution. In all free governments, that is, in all countries, where\u202f<\/span>laws govern<\/span><\/i>, and not\u202f<\/span>men<\/span><\/i>, the supreme magistrate should have it in his power to execute any law, however unpopular, without hazarding his person or office. The laws are the sole\u202f<\/span>guardians<\/span><\/i>\u202fof right, and when the magistrate dares not act, every person is insecure.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Let us now attend to the constitution and the powers of the senate.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The house of lords in England is\u00a0wholly independent\u00a0of the people. The lords\u00a0spiritual\u00a0hold their seats by office; and the people at large have no voice in disposing of the ecclesiastical dignities. The temporal lords hold their seats by hereditary right or by grant from the king: And it is a branch of the king\u2019s prerogative to make what peers he pleases.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The\u00a0senate\u00a0in Rome was elective; but a senator held his seat for life. The proposed senate in America is constituted on principles more favorable to liberty: The members are elective, and by the separate legislatures: They hold their seats for six years\u2014they are thus rendered\u00a0sufficiently dependent on their constituents; and yet are not dismissed from their office as soon as they become acquainted with the forms of proceeding.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It may be\u00a0objected\u00a0by the larger states, that the representation is not equal; the smallest states having the privilege of sending the same number of senators as the largest. To obviate this objection, I would\u00a0suggest but\u00a0two or three ideas.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

1. If each state had a representation and a right in deciding questions, proportional to its propriety, three states would almost command the whole. Such a constitution would gradually annihilate the small states; and finally melt down the whole United States into one undivided sovereignty. The free states of Spain and the heptarchy in England, afford striking examples of this.<\/span><\/p>\n

Should it be said that such an event is desirable, I answer; the states are all entitled to their respective sovereignties, and while they claim independence in international\u00a0jurisdiction, the federal constitution ought to guarantee their sovereignty.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

2. Another consideration has weight\u2014There is, in all nations, a tendency toward an accumulation of power in some point. It is the business of the legislator to establish some barriers to check the tendency. In small societies, a man worth \u00a3.100,000 has but one vote, when his neighbors, who are worth but fifty pounds, have each one vote likewise. To make property the sole basis of authority, would expose many of the best citizens to violence and oppression. To make the number of inhabitants in a state, the rule of apportioning power, is more equitable; and were the United States one indivisible interest, would be a perfect rule for representation. But the detached situation of the states has created some separate interests\u2014some local institutions, which they will not resign nor throw into the hands of other states. For these peculiar interests, the states have an\u202f<\/span>equal<\/span><\/i>\u202fattachment\u2014for the preservation and enjoyment of these, an\u202f<\/span>equal<\/span><\/i>\u202fsovereignty is necessary; and the sovereignty of each state would not be secure, had each state, in both branches of the legislature an authority in passing laws, proportioned to its inhabitants.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

3. But the senate should be considered as representing the confederacy in a body. It is a false principle in the vulgar idea of representation, that a man delegated by a particular district in a state, is the representative of that district only; whereas in truth a member of the legislature from any town or county, is the representative of the whole state. In passing laws, he is to view the whole collective interest of the state, and act from that view; not from a partial regard to the interest of the town or county where he is chosen.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The same principle extends to the Congress of the United States. A delegate is bound to\u00a0represent\u00a0the true local interest of his constituents\u2014to state in its true light to the whole body\u2014but when each provincial interest is thus\u00a0stated, every member should act for\u00a0the\u202f<\/span>aggregate interest<\/span><\/i>\u202fof the whole confederacy. The design of representation is to bring the collective interest into view\u2014a delegate is not the legislator of a single state\u2014he is as much the legislator of the whole confederacy as of the particular state where he is chosen; and if he gives his vote for a law which he believes to be beneficial to his own state only, and pernicious to the rest, he betrays his trust and violated his oath. It is indeed difficult for a man to divest himself of local attachments and act from an impartial regard to the general good; but he who cannot\u00a0for the most part do\u00a0this, is not a good legislator.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

These considerations suggest the propriety of continuing the senators in office, for a longer\u00a0period,\u00a0than the representatives. They gradually lose their partiality, generalize their views, and consider\u00a0themselves as\u00a0acting for the whole confederacy. Hence in the senate we may expect union and firmness\u2014here we may find the\u202f<\/span>general\u00a0good<\/span><\/i>\u202fthe object of legislation, and a check upon the more partial and interested acts of the other branch.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

These considerations obviate the complaint, that the representation in the senate is not equal; for the senators\u00a0represent\u00a0the whole confederacy; and all that is wanted of the members is information of the true situation and interest of each state. As they act under the direction of the several legislatures, two men may as fully and completely represent a state, as twenty; and when the true interest of each state is known, if the senators perform the part of good legislators, and act impartially for the whole collective body of the United States, it is totally immaterial where they are chosen.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The house of representatives is the more immediate voice of the separate states\u2014here the states are represented in proportion to their number of inhabitants\u2014here the separate interests will operate with their full force, and the violence of parties and the jealousies produced by interfering interests, can be restrained and quieted only by a body of men, less local and dependent.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It may be objected that no separate interests should exist in a state; and a division of the legislature\u00a0has a tendency to\u00a0create them. But this objection is founded on mere jealousy, or a very imperfect comparison of the Roman and British governments, with the proposed federal constitution.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The house of peers in England is a body originally and totally independent of the people\u2014the senate in Rome was mostly composed of patrician or noble families, and after the first election of a senator, he was no longer dependent on the people\u2014he held his seat for life. But the senate of the United States can have no separate interests from the body of the people; for they live among them\u2014they are chosen by them\u2014they\u202f<\/span>must<\/span><\/i>\u202fbe dismissed from their place once in six years and\u202f<\/span>may<\/span><\/i>\u202fat any time be impeached for mal-practices\u2014their property is situated among the people, and with their persons, subject to the same laws.\u00a0No title can be granted, but the temporary titles of office, bestowed by the voluntary election of the people; and no pre-eminence can be\u00a0acquired\u00a0but by the same means.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The separation of the legislature divides the power\u2014checks\u2014restraints\u2014amends the proceedings\u2014at the same\u00a0time,\u00a0it creates no division of interest, that can tempt either branch to encroach upon the other, or upon the people. In turbulent times, such restraint is our greatest safety\u2014in calm times, and in measures obviously calculated for the general\u00a0good,\u00a0both branches must always be unanimous.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

A man must be thirty years of age before he can be admitted into the senate\u2014which was likewise a requisite in the Roman government. What property was requisite for a senator in the early ages of Rome, I cannot inform myself; but Augustus fixed it at six hundred\u00a0sestertia\u2014between\u00a0sic\u00a0and seven thousand pounds sterling. In the federal constitution, money is not made a requisite\u2014the places of senators are wisely left open to all persons of suitable age and merit, and who have been citizens of the United States for nine years; a term in which foreigners may acquire the feelings and acquaint themselves with the interests, of the native Americans.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The house of representatives is formed on very equitable principles; and is calculated to guard the privileges of the people. The English house of commons is chosen by a small part of the people of England, and continues for seven years. The Romans never discovered the secret of representation\u2014the whole body of citizens assembled for the purposes of legislation\u2014a circumstance that exposed their government to frequent convulsions, and to capricious measures. The federal house of representatives is chosen by the people qualified to vote for state representatives, and continues two years.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Some may object to their continuance in\u00a0power\u202f<\/span>two years<\/span><\/i>. But I cannot see any danger arising from this quarter. On the contrary, it creates less trouble for the representatives, who by such choice are taken from their professions and obliged to attend Congress, some of them at the distance of at least seven hundred miles. While men are chosen by the people, and responsible to them, there is but little danger from ambition or corruption.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

If it should be said that Congress may in time become triennial, and even septennial, lie the English parliaments, I answer, this is not in their power. The English parliament had power to prolong the period of their existence\u2014but Congress will be restrained by the different legislatures, without whose constitutional concurrence, no alteration can be made in the proposed system.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The fourth section, article I, of the new constitution declares that \u201cThe times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in \u201ceach state by the legislature thereof;\u202f<\/span>but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such\u00a0regulations, except as to the places of\u00a0chusing\u00a0senators<\/span><\/i>.\u201d Here let us pause\u2014What did the convention mean by giving Congress power to\u202f<\/span>make regulations<\/span><\/i>, prescribed by the legislatures? Is this expression\u00a0accurate\u00a0or intelligible? But the word\u202f<\/span>alter<\/span><\/i>\u202fis very intelligible, and the clause puts the election of\u00a0representatives\u202f<\/span>wholly<\/span><\/i>, and\u00a0the senators\u202f<\/span>almost wholly<\/span><\/i>, in the power of Congress.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The views of the convention I believe to be perfectly upright\u2014They might mean to place the election of representatives and senators beyond the reach of faction\u2014They doubtless had good reasons, in\u202f<\/span>their<\/span><\/i>\u202f, minds, for the clause\u2014But I see no occasion for any power in Congress to interfere with the choice of their own body\u2014They will have power to suppress insurrections, as they ought to have; but the clause in\u202f<\/span>Italics<\/span><\/i>\u202fgives\u202f<\/span>needless<\/span><\/i>\u202fand\u202f<\/span>dangerous<\/span><\/i>\u202fpowers\u2014I hope the states will reject it with decency, and adopt the whole system, without altering another syllable.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The method of passing laws in Congress is much preferable to that of ancient Rome or modern Britain. Not to mention other defects in\u00a0Rome,\u00a0it lay in the power of a single tribune to obstruct the passing of a law. As the tribunes were\u00a0popular\u00a0magistrate, the right was often exercised in favor of liberty; but it was also abused, and the best regulations were prevented to gratify the spleen, the ambition, or the resentment of an individual.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The king of\u00a0Great-Britain\u00a0has the same\u00a0power, but\u00a0seldom exercises it. It is however a dangerous power\u2014it is absurd and hazardous to lodge in\u202f<\/span>one man<\/span><\/i>\u202fthe right of controlling the will of a state.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Every bill that passes a majority of both houses of Congress, must be sent to the president for his approbation; but it must be returned in ten days, whether approved by him or not; and the concurrence of two thirds of both houses passes the bill into a law, notwithstanding any objections of the president. The constitution therefore gives the supreme executive a check but no negative, upon the sense of Congress.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The powers lodged in Congress are extensive; but it is presumed that they are not too extensive. The first object of the constitution is to\u202f<\/span>unite<\/span><\/i>\u202fthe states into one\u202f<\/span>compact society<\/span><\/i>, for the purpose of government. If such\u202f<\/span>union<\/span><\/i>\u202fmust exist, or the states be exposed to foreign invasions, internal discord, reciprocal encroachments upon each other property\u2014to weakness and infamy, which no person will dispute; what powers must be collected and lodged in the supreme head or legislature of these states. The answer is easy: This legislature must have exclusive\u00a0jurisdiction\u00a0in all\u00a0matter\u00a0in which the states have\u00a0a mutual\u00a0interest. There are some regulations in which all the states are equally concerned\u2014there are others, which in their operation, are limited to one state. The first belongs to Congress\u2014the last to the respective legislatures. No one state has a right to\u00a0supreme control, in any affair in which the other states have an interest, nor should Congress interfere in any affair which respects one state only. This is the general line of division, which the\u00a0convention\u00a0have\u00a0endeavored\u00a0to draw, between the powers of Congress and the rights of the individual states. The only question\u00a0therefore is,\u00a0whether the new constitution delegates to Congress any powers which do not respect the general interest and welfare of the United States. If these powers intrench upon the present sovereignty of any\u202f<\/span>state<\/span><\/i>, without\u00a0having for\u00a0an object the\u202f<\/span>collective interest<\/span><\/i>\u202fof the whole, the powers are too extensive. But if they do not extend to all concerns, in which the states have\u00a0a mutual\u00a0interest, they are too limited. If in any instance, the powers necessary for protecting the\u202f<\/span>general<\/span><\/i>\u202finterest, interfere with the constitutional rights of an\u202f<\/span>individual<\/span><\/i>\u202fstate, such state has assumed powers that are inconsistent with the safety of the United States, and which ought instantly to be resigned. Considering the states as individuals, on equal terms, entering into a social compact, no state has a right to any power which may prejudice its neighbors. If therefore the federal constitution has collected into the federal legislature no more power than is necessary for the\u202f<\/span>common\u00a0defence\u00a0and interest<\/span><\/i>,\u00a0It\u00a0should be recognized by the states, however particular clauses may supersede the exercise of certain powers by the individual states.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This question is of vast\u00a0magnitude. The states have\u00a0very high\u00a0ideas of their separate sovereignty; although\u2014 it is certain, that while each exists in its full latitude, we can have no\u202f<\/span>Federal sovereignty<\/span><\/i>. However flattered each state may be by its independent sovereignty, we can have no union, no respectability, no national character, and what is more, no national justice, till the states resign to one\u202f<\/span>supreme head<\/span><\/i>\u202fthe exclusive power of\u202f<\/span>legislating, judging and executing<\/span><\/i>, in all matters of a general nature.\u00a0Every thing\u00a0of a private or provincial nature, must still rest on the ground of the respective state-constitutions.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

After examining the limits of the proposed congressional powers, I confess I do not think them too extensive\u2014I firmly believe that the life, liberty and property of every man, and the peace and independence of each state, will be more fully secured under such a constitution of federal government, than they will under a constitution with more limited powers; and infinitely more safe than under our boasted distinct sovereignties. It appears to me that Congress will have no more power than will be necessary for our union and general welfare; and such power they must\u00a0have\u00a0or we are in a wretched state. On the adoption of this constitution, I should value real estate twenty per cent. higher than I do at this moment.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

I will not\u00a0examine into\u00a0the extent of the powers proposed to be lodged in the supreme federal head; the subject would be extensive and require more time than I could bestow\u00a0upon it. But I will take up some\u00a0objections,\u00a0that have been made to\u00a0particular points\u00a0of the new constitution.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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\nMost of the objections I have yet heard to the constitution, consist in mere insinuations unsupported by reasoning or fact. They are thrown out to instill groundless jealousies into the minds of the people, and probably with a view to prevent all government; for there are, in every society, some turbulent geniuses whose importance depends solely on faction. To seek the insidious and detestable nature of these insinuations, it is necessary to mention, and to remark on a few particulars.<\/span><\/p>\n

1. The first objection against the constitution is, that the legislature will be more expensive than our present confederation. This is so far from being true, that the money we actually lose by our present weakness, disunion and\u202f<\/span>want of government<\/span><\/i>\u202fwould support the civil government of every state in the confederacy. Our public poverty does not\u00a0proceed\u00a0from the expensiveness of Congress, nor of the civil list; but from\u00a0want\u00a0of power to command our own advantages. We pay more money to foreign nations,\u00a0in the course of\u00a0business, and merely for\u202f<\/span>want of government<\/span><\/i>, than would, under an efficient government, pay the annual interest of our domestic debt. Every man in business knows this to be\u202f<\/span>truth<\/span><\/i>; and the objection can be designed only to delude the ignorant.<\/span><\/p>\n

2. Another objection to the constitution, is the division of the legislature into two branches. Luckily this objection has no advocates but in Pennsylvania; and even here their number is dwindling. The factions that reign in this state, the internal discord and passions that disturb the government and the peace of the inhabitants, have detected the errors of the constitution, and will some time or other produce a reformation. The division of the legislature has been the subject of discussion in the beginning of this essay; and will be deemed, by nineteen-twentieths of Americans, one of the principal excellencies of the constitution.<\/span><\/p>\n

3. A third insinuation, is that the proposed federal government will annihilate the several legislatures. This is extremely disingenuous. Every person, capable of reading, must discover, that the convention have labored to draw the line between the federal and provincial powers\u2014to define the powers of Congress, and limit them to those general concerns which\u202f<\/span>must<\/span><\/i>\u202fcome under federal jurisdiction, and which\u202f<\/span>cannot<\/span><\/i>\u202fbe managed in the separate legislatures\u2014that in all internal regulations, whether of civil or criminal nature, the states retain their sovereignty, and have it guaranteed to them by this very constitution. Such a groundless insinuation, or rather mere surmise, must proceed from dark designs or extreme ignorance, and deserves the severest reprobation.<\/span><\/p>\n

4. It is alleged that the liberty of the press is not guaranteed by the new constitution. But this objection is wholly unfounded. The liberty of the press does not come within the jurisdiction of federal government. It is firmly established in all the states either by law, or positive declarations in\u202f<\/span>bills of right<\/span><\/i>; and not being mentioned in the federal constitution, is not\u2014and cannot be abridged by Congress. It stands on the basis of the respective\u00a0state-constitutions. Should any state resign to Congress the exclusive jurisdiction of a certain district, which should include any town where presses are already established, it is in the power of the state to reserve the liberty of the press, or any other fundamental privilege, and make it an immutable condition of the grant, that such rights shall never be violated. All objections therefore on this score are\u202f<\/span>\u201cbaseless visions.\u201d<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n

5. It is insinuated that the constitution gives Congress the power of levying internal taxes at pleasure. This insinuation seems founded on the eighth section of the first article, which declares, that \u201cCongress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States.\u201d<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

That Congress should have power to collect duties,\u00a0imposts\u00a0and excises,\u00a0in order to\u00a0render\u00a0them uniform throughout the United States will hardly be controverted. The whole objection is to the right\u00a0of levying\u00a0internal taxes.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But it will be conceded that the supreme head of the states must have power, competent to the purposes of our union, or it will be, as it now is, a\u202f<\/span>useless body<\/span><\/i>, a mere expense, without any advantage. To pay our public debt, to support foreign ministers and our own civil government, money must be raised; and if the duties and imposts are not adequate\u00a0to\u00a0these purposes, where shall the money be obtained? It will be answered, let Congress apportion the sum to be raised, and leave the legislatures to collect the money.\u00a0Well\u00a0this is all that is intended by the clause under consideration; with the addition of a federal power that shall be sufficient to oblige a delinquent state to\u00a0comply with\u00a0the requisition. Such power must exist somewhere, or the debts of the United States can never be paid. For want of such power, our credit is\u00a0lost\u00a0and our national faith is a bye-word.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

For want of such power, one state now complies fully with a\u00a0requisition,\u00a0another partially, and a third absolutely refuses or neglects to grant a shilling.\u00a0Thus\u00a0the honest and punctual are doubly loaded\u2014and the knave triumphs in his negligence. In short, no honest man will dread a power that shall enforce\u00a0an equitable\u00a0system of taxation. The dishonest are ever apprehensive of a power that shall oblige them to do what honest men are ready to do voluntarily.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Permit\u00a0me to ask those who object to this power of taxation, how\u00a0shall money be raised to discharge our honest debts which are universally acknowledged to be just? Have we not already experienced the inefficacy of a system without power? Has it not been proved to\u00a0demonstration,\u00a0that a voluntary compliance with the demands of the union can never be expected? To what expedient shall we have recourse? What is the resort of all governments in cases of delinquency? Do not the states vest in the legislature, or even in the governor and council, a power to enforce laws, even with the militia of the states? And how rarely does there exist the necessity of exerting such a power? Why should such a power be more dangerous in Congress than in a legislature? Why should more confidence be reposed in a member of one legislature than of another? Why should we choose the best men in the state to\u00a0represent\u00a0us in Congress, and the moment they are elected arm ourselves against them as against tyrants and robbers? Do we not, in this conduct, act the part of a man, who, as soon as he has married a woman of unsuspected chastity, locks her up in a dungeon? Is there any spell or charm, that instantly changes a delegate to Congress from an honest man into a knave\u2014a tyrant? I confess freely that I am willing to trust Congress with any powers that I should dare\u00a0lodge\u00a0in a state-legislature. I believe life, liberty, and property\u00a0is\u00a0as safe in the hands of a federal legislature, organized\u00a0in the manner proposed by the convention, as in the hands of any legislature, that has ever been or ever will be chosen in any particular state.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But the idea that Congress can levy taxes\u202f<\/span>at pleasure<\/span><\/i>\u202fis false, and the suggestion\u00a0wholly unsupported. The preamble to the constitution is declaratory of the purposes of our union, and the assumption of any powers not necessary to\u202f<\/span>establish justice,\u00a0insure\u00a0domestic tranquility, provide for the common\u00a0defence, promote the general welfare, and to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity<\/span><\/i>, will be unconstitutional, and endanger the existence of Congress. Besides, in the very clause which gives the power of levying duties and taxes, the purposes to which the money shall be appropriated are specified, viz.\u202f<\/span>to pay the debts and provide for the common\u00a0defence\u00a0and general welfare of the United States<\/span><\/i>. For these purposes money must be collected, and the power of collection must be lodged,\u00a0sooner or later, in a federal head; or the common\u00a0defence\u00a0and general welfare must be neglected.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The states in their separate\u00a0capacity,\u00a0cannot provide for the\u202f<\/span>common<\/span><\/i>\u202fdefence; nay in case of a civil war, a state cannot secure its own existence. The only question\u00a0therefore is,\u00a0whether it is necessary to unite, and provide for our\u202f<\/span>common\u00a0defence\u00a0and general welfare<\/span><\/i>. For this question being once decided in the affirmative, leaves no room to controvert the propriety of constituting a power over the whole United States, adequate to these general purposes.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The states, by granting such power, do not throw it out of their own hands\u2014they only throw, each its proportion, into a common stock\u2014they merely combine the powers of the several states into one point, where they\u202f<\/span>must<\/span><\/i>\u202fbe collected, before they\u202f<\/span>can<\/span><\/i>\u202fbe exerted. But the powers are still in their own\u00a0hands;\u00a0and cannot be alienated, till they create a body independent of themselves, with a force at their command, superior to the whole yeomanry of the country.<\/span><\/p>\n

6. It is said there is no provision made in the new constitution against a standing army in time of peace. Why do not people object that no provision is made against the introduction of a body of Turkish Janizaries; or against making the Alcoran the rule of faith and practice, instead of the Bible? The answer to such objections is simply this\u2014<\/span>no such provision is necessary<\/span><\/i>. The people in this country cannot forget their apprehensions from a British standing army, quartered in America; and they turn their fears and jealousies against themselves. Why do not the people of most of the states apprehend danger from standing armies from their own legislatures? Pennsylvania and North Carolina, I believe, are the only states that have provided against this danger at all events. Other states have declared that \u201cno standing armies shall be kept up without the consent of the legislature.\u201d But this leaves the power entirely in the hands of the legislature. Many of the states however have made\u202f<\/span>no provision<\/span><\/i>\u202fagainst this evil. What\u00a0hazards\u00a0these states suffer! Why does not a man pass a law in his family, that no armed soldier shall be quartered in his house by his consent? The reason is very plain: no man will suffer his liberty to be abridged, or endangered\u2014his disposition and his power are uniformly opposed to any infringement of his rights. In the same manner, the\u00a0principles\u00a0and habits, as well as the power of the Americans are directly opposed to standing armies; and there is as little necessity to guard against them by positive constitutions, as to prohibit the establishment of the Mahometan religion.\u00a0But the constitution provides for our safety; and while it gives Congress power to raise armies, it declares that no appropriation of money to their support shall be for a longer term than two years.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Congress likewise\u00a0are\u00a0to have power to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, but have no other command of them, except when in actual service. Nor are they at liberty to call out the militia at pleasure\u2014but only, to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions. For these purposes, government must always be armed with a military force, if the occasion should require it;\u00a0otherwise\u00a0laws are nugatory, and life and property insecure.<\/span><\/p>\n

7. Some persons have ventured to publish an intimation, that by the proposed constitution, the trial by jury is abolished in all\u202f<\/span>civil cases<\/span><\/i>. Others very modestly insinuate, that it is in\u202f<\/span>some cases<\/span><\/i>\u202fonly. The fact is, that trial by jury is not affected in\u202f<\/span>any case<\/span><\/i>, by the\u00a0constitution; except in cases of impeachment, which are to be tried by the senate. None but persons in office in or under Congress can be impeached; and even after a judgment upon an impeachment, the offender is liable to a prosecution, before a common jury, in a regular course of law. The insinuation therefore that trials by jury are to be abolished, is groundless, and beyond conception, wicked. It must be wicked, because the circulation of a barefaced falsehood, respecting a privilege, dear to freemen, can\u00a0proceed\u00a0only from a depraved heart and the worst intentions.<\/span><\/p>\n

8. It is also intimated as a probable event, that the federal courts will absorb the judiciaries of the federal states. This is a mere suspicion, without the least foundation. The jurisdiction of the federal states is very accurately defined and easily understood. It extends to the cases mentioned in the constitution, and to the execution of the laws of Congress, respecting commerce, revenue, and other general concerns.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

With respect to other civil and criminal actions, the powers and\u00a0jurisdiction\u00a0of the several judiciaries of each\u00a0state,\u00a0remain unimpaired. Nor is there anything novel in allowing appeals to the supreme court. Actions are mostly to be tried in the state where the crimes are committed\u2014But appeals are allowed under our present confederation, and no person complains; nay, were there no appeal, every man would have reason to complain, especially when a final judgment, in an inferior court, should affect property to a large amount. But why is an objection raised against an appellate\u00a0jurisdiction\u00a0in the supreme court, respecting\u202f<\/span>fact<\/span><\/i>\u202fas well as\u202f<\/span>law<\/span><\/i>? Is it less safe to have the opinions of two juries than of one? I suspect many people will think this is no defect in the constitution. But\u00a0perhaps it\u00a0will destroy a material requisite of a good jury, viz. their vicinity to the cause of action. I have no doubt, that when causes were tried, in periods prior to the Christian era, before twelve men, seated upon twelve stones, arranged in a circular form, under a huge oak, there was great propriety in submitting causes to men\u202f<\/span>in the vicinity<\/span><\/i>. The difficulty of collecting evidence, in those rude times,\u00a0rendered\u00a0it necessary that juries should judge mostly from their own knowledge of facts or from information obtained out of court. But in these polished ages, when juries depend almost wholly on the testimony of witnesses; and when a complication of interests, introduced by commerce and other causes, renders it almost impossible to collect men, in the vicinity of the parties, who are wholly disinterested, it is no disadvantage to have a cause tried by a jury of strangers.\u00a0Indeed\u00a0the latter is\u00a0generally the\u00a0most eligible.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But the truth is, the creation of all inferior courts is in the power of the Congress; and the constitution provides that Congress may make such exceptions from the right of appeals as they shall judge\u00a0proper. When these courts are erected, their\u00a0jurisdictions\u00a0will be\u00a0ascertained, and in small\u00a0actions,\u00a0Congress will doubtless direct that a sentence in a\u00a0subordinate court shall, to a certain amount, be definite and final. All objections therefore to the judicial powers of the federal courts appear to me as trifling as any of the preceding.<\/span><\/p>\n

9. But, say the enemies of slavery, negroes may be imported for twenty-one years. This exception is addressed to the quakers; and a very pitiful exception it is.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The truth is, Congress cannot prohibit the importation of slaves during that period; but the laws against the importation into particular\u00a0states,\u00a0stand unrepealed. An immediate abolition of slavery would bring ruin upon the whites, and misery upon the blacks, in the southern states. The constitution has therefore wisely left each state to pursue its own measures, with respect to this article of legislation, during the period of twenty-one years.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Such are the principal objections that have yet been made by the enemies of the new constitution. They are mostly frivolous, or founded on false constructions, and a misrepresentation of the true state of facts. They are\u00a0evidently designed\u00a0to raise groundless jealousies in the minds of\u00a0well meaning\u00a0people, who have little leisure and opportunity to\u00a0examine into\u00a0the principles of government. But a little time and reflection will enable most people to detect such mischievous intentions; and the spirit and firmness which have distinguished the conduct of the Americans, during the conflict for independence, will eventually triumph over the enemies of union, and bury them in disgrace or oblivion.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But I cannot quit this subject without\u00a0attempting\u00a0to correct some of the\u00a0erroneous\u00a0opinions respecting\u202f<\/span>freedom and tyranny<\/span><\/i>, and the principles by which they are supported. Many people\u00a0seem to entertain\u00a0an\u00a0idea,\u00a0that liberty consists\u00a0in\u202f<\/span>a power to act without any control<\/span><\/i>. This is more liberty than even the savages enjoy. But in civil society, political liberty consists\u00a0in\u202f<\/span>acting conformably to\u00a0a sense\u00a0of\u00a0a majority\u00a0of\u00a0the society<\/span><\/i>. In a free government every man binds himself to obey the\u202f<\/span>public voice<\/span><\/i>, or the opinions of a majority; and the\u202f<\/span>whole society<\/span><\/i>\u202fengages to\u202f<\/span>protect\u00a0each individual<\/span><\/i>. In such a government a man is\u202f<\/span>free<\/span><\/i>\u202fand safe. But reverse the case; suppose every man to act without control or fear of punishment\u2014every man would be free, but no man would be sure of his freedom one moment. Each would have the power of taking his neighbor\u2019s life, liberty, or property; and no man would command more than his own strength to repel the invasion. The case is the same with\u00a0states. If the states should not unite into one compact society, every state may\u00a0trespass upon\u00a0its neighbor, and the injured state has no means of redress but its own military force.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The present situation of our American states is\u00a0very little\u00a0better than a state of nature\u2014Our boasted state sovereignties are so far from securing our liberty and property, that they, every moment, expose us to the loss of both. That state which commands the heaviest purse and longest sword, may at any moment, lay its weaker neighbor under tribute; and\u00a0there is no superior power now existing, that can regularly oppose the invasion or redress the injury. From such liberty, O Lord, deliver us!<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But what is tyranny? Or how can\u00a0a free\u00a0people be deprived of their liberties? Tyranny is the exercise of some power over a man, which is not\u00a0warranted\u00a0by law, or necessary for the public safety.\u00a0A people\u00a0can never be deprived of their liberties, while they\u00a0retain\u00a0in their own hands, a power sufficient to any other power in the state. This position leads me directly to enquire, in what\u00a0consists\u00a0the power of a nation or of an order of men?<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In some nations, legislators have derived much of their power from the influence of religion, or from that implicit belief which an ignorant and superstitious people entertain of the gods, and their interposition in every transaction of life. The Roman senate sometimes availed themselves of this engine to carry their decrees and\u00a0maintain\u00a0their authority. This was particularly the case, under the aristocracy which\u00a0succeeded\u00a0the abolition of the monarchy. The augurs and priests were taken\u00a0wholly from\u00a0patrician families. They\u00a0constituted\u00a0a distinct order of men\u2014had power to negative any law of the people, by declaring that it was passed during the taking of the auspices. This influence derived from the authority of opinion, was less perceptible, but as tyrannical as a military force. The same influence\u00a0constitutes,\u00a0at\u00a0this day, a principal support of federal governments on the Eastern continent, and\u00a0perhaps in\u00a0South America. But in North America, by a singular concurrence of circumstances, the possibility of\u00a0establishing\u00a0this influence, as a pillar of government, is totally precluded.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Another source of power in government is\u00a0a military\u00a0force. But this, to be efficient, must be superior to any force that exists among the people, or which they can\u00a0command:\u00a0for otherwise this force would be annihilated, on the first exercise of acts of oppression. Before a standing army can rule, the people must be\u00a0disarmed;\u00a0as they are in\u00a0almost every\u00a0kingdom in Europe. The supreme power in America cannot enforce unjust laws by the sword; because the whole body of the people are\u00a0armed, and\u00a0constitute a force superior to any band of regular troops that can be, on any\u00a0pretence, raised in the United States. A military force, at the command of Congress, can execute no laws, but such as the people perceive to be just and constitutional; for they will possess the\u202f<\/span>power<\/span><\/i>, and jealousy will instantly inspire the\u202f<\/span>inclination<\/span><\/i>, to resist the execution of a law which appears to them unjust and oppressive.\u00a0In spite of\u00a0all the nominal powers, vested in Congress by the constitution, were the system once adopted in its fullest latitude, still the actual exercise of them would be\u00a0frequently\u00a0interrupted by popular jealousy. I am bold to\u00a0say,\u00a0that\u202f<\/span>ten<\/span><\/i>\u202fjust and\u00a0constitutional measures would be resisted, where\u202f<\/span>one<\/span><\/i>\u202funjust or oppressive law would be enforced. The powers vested in Congress are little more than\u202f<\/span>nominal<\/span><\/i>;\u00a0nay\u202f<\/span>real<\/span><\/i>\u202fpower\u00a0cannot be vested in them nor in\u00a0any body, but in the\u202f<\/span>people<\/span><\/i>. The source of power is in the\u202f<\/span>people<\/span><\/i>\u202fof this country, and cannot for ages, and\u00a0probably never\u00a0will, be removed.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In what then does\u202f<\/span>real<\/span><\/i>\u202fpower\u00a0consist? The answer is short and plain\u2014in\u202f<\/span>property<\/span><\/i>. Could we want any\u00a0proofs\u00a0of this, which are not\u00a0exhibited\u00a0in this country, the uniform testimony of history will\u00a0furnish us with\u00a0multitudes. But I will go no farther for proof, than the two governments already mentioned, the Roman and the British.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Rome\u00a0exhibited\u00a0a demonstrative proof of the inseparable\u00a0connexion\u00a0between property and dominion. The first form of its government was an elective monarchy\u2014its second, an aristocracy; but these forms could not be permanent, because they were not supported by property. The kings at first and afterwards the patricians had nominally most of the power; but the people,\u00a0possessing\u00a0most of the lands, never ceased to assert their privileges, till they\u00a0established\u00a0a commonwealth. And the kings and senate could not have held the\u00a0reigns\u00a0of government in their hands so long as they did, had they not artfully contrived to manage the established religion, and play off the superstitious credulity of the people against their own power. \u201cThus this weak constitution of government,\u201d says the ingenious Mr. Moyle, speaking of the aristocracy of Rome, \u201cnot founded on the true\u202f<\/span>center of dominion, land<\/span><\/i>, nor on any standing foundation of authority, nor riveted in the esteem and affections of the people; and being attacked by strong passion, general interest and the joint forces of the people,\u00a0mouldered\u00a0away of course, and pined of a lingering consumption, till it was totally swallowed up by the prevailing faction, and the nobility were\u00a0moulded\u00a0into the mass of the people.\u201d The people,\u00a0notwithstanding\u00a0the nominal authority of the patricians,\u00a0proceeded\u00a0regularly in enlarging their own powers. They first extorted from the senate, the right of electing\u202f<\/span>tribunes<\/span><\/i>, with a negative upon the proceedings of the senate. They obtained the rights of proposing the debating\u00a0laws;\u00a0which before had been vested in the senate; and finally advanced to the power of enacting laws, without the authority of the senate. They regained the rights of election in their comitia, of which they had been deprived by Servius Tullius. They\u00a0procured\u00a0a permanent body of laws, collected from the Grecian institutions. They destroyed the influence of augurs, or diviners, by\u00a0establishing\u00a0the\u202f<\/span>tribute comitia<\/span><\/i>, in which they were not allowed to consult the gods. They increased their power by large accessions of conquered lands. They\u00a0procured\u00a0a repeal of the law which prohibited marriages between the patricians and plebians. The\u00a0Licinian\u00a0law limited all possessions to five hundred acres of land; which, had it been fully executed, would have secured the commonwealth.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

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\nThe Romans\u00a0proceeded\u00a0thus step by step to triumph over the aristocracy, and to crown their\u00a0privileges,\u00a0they\u00a0procured\u00a0the right of being elected to the highest offices of the state. By acquiring\u202f<\/span>the property<\/span><\/i>\u202fof the plebians, the nobility, several times, held most of the power\u00a0of the state; but the people, by reducing the interest of money, abolishing debts, or by forcing other advantages from the patricians, generally held the power of governing in their own hands.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In America, we begin our empire with more popular privileges than the Romans ever enjoyed. We\u00a0have not\u00a0to struggle against a monarch or an aristocracy\u2014power is lodged in the mass of the people.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

On reviewing the English history, we\u00a0observe\u00a0a progress\u00a0similar to\u00a0that in Rome\u2014an incessant struggle for liberty from the date of Magna Charta, in John\u2019s reign, to the revolution. The struggle has been successful, by abridging the enormous power of\u00a0the nobility. But we\u00a0observe\u00a0that the power of the people has increased in an exact proportion to their acquisitions of property. Wherever the right of primogeniture is\u00a0established, property must accumulate and remain in families.\u00a0Thus\u00a0the landed property in England will never be sufficiently distributed, to give the powers of government\u00a0wholly into\u00a0the\u00a0hand\u00a0of the people. But to\u00a0assist\u00a0the struggle for liberty, commerce has interposed, and in conjunction with manufacturers, thrown a vast weight of property into the democratic scale. Wherever we cast our eyes, we see this\u00a0truth,\u00a0that\u202f<\/span>property<\/span><\/i>\u202fis the basis of\u202f<\/span>power<\/span><\/i>; and this, being\u00a0established\u00a0as a cardinal point, directs us to the means of preserving our freedom. Make laws, irrevocable laws, in every state, destroying and barring entailments; leave real estates to revolve from hand to hand, as time and accident may direct; and no family influence can be acquired and established for a series of generations\u2014no man can obtain dominion over a large territory\u2014the laborious and saving, who are generally the best citizens, will possess each his share of property and power, and thus the balance of wealth and power will continue where it is, in the\u202f<\/span>body of the people<\/span><\/i>.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

A general and tolerably equal distribution of landed property is the whole basis of national freedom<\/span><\/i>: The system of the great Montesquieu will ever be\u00a0erroneous, till the words\u202f<\/span>property or lands in fee simple<\/span><\/i>\u202fare substituted for\u202f<\/span>virtue<\/span><\/i>, throughout his\u202f<\/span>Spirit of Laws<\/span><\/i>.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Virtue<\/span><\/i>, patriotism, or love of country, never was and never will be, till men\u2019s natures are changed, a fixed, permanent principle and support of government. But in an agricultural country, a general possession of land in fee simple, may be\u00a0rendered\u00a0perpetual, and the inequalities introduced by commerce, are too fluctuating to endanger government. An equality of property, with a necessity of alienation, constantly operating to destroy combinations of powerful families, is the very\u202f<\/span>soul of a republic<\/span><\/i>\u2014While this continues, the people will inevitably possess both\u202f<\/span>power<\/span><\/i>\u202fand freedom; when this is lost, power departs, liberty expires, and a commonwealth will inevitably assume some other form.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The liberty of the press, trial by jury, the Habeas Corpus writ, even Magna Charta itself, although justly\u00a0deemed\u00a0the palladia of freedom, are all inferior considerations, when compared with a general distribution of real property among every class of people. The power of entailing estates is more dangerous to liberty and republican government, than all the constitutions that can be written on paper, or even than a standing army. Let the people have property, and they\u202f<\/span>will<\/span><\/i>\u202fhave power\u2014a power that will\u00a0for ever\u00a0be exerted to prevent a restriction of the press, and abolition of trial by jury, or the abridgement of any other privilege. The liberties of America, therefore, and her forms of government, stand on the broadest basis. Removed from the fears of a foreign invasion and conquest, they are not exposed to the convulsions that shake other governments; and the principles of freedom are so general and energetic, as to exclude the possibility of a change in our republican constitutions.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But while\u202f<\/span>property<\/span><\/i>\u202fis considered as the\u202f<\/span>basis<\/span><\/i>\u202fof the freedom of the American yeomanry, there are other auxiliary supports; among which is the\u202f<\/span>information of the people<\/span><\/i>. In no country, is education so general\u2014in no country, have the body of the people such a knowledge of the rights of men and the principles of government. This knowledge, joined with a keen sense of liberty and a watchful jealousy, will guard our constitutions, and awaken the people to an instantaneous resistance of encroachments.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But a principal bulwark of freedom is the\u202f<\/span>right of election<\/span><\/i>. An equal distribution of property is the\u202f<\/span>foundation<\/span><\/i>\u202fof a republic; but\u202f<\/span>popular elections<\/span><\/i>\u202fform the\u202f<\/span>great barrier<\/span><\/i>, which defends it from assault, and guards it from the slow and imperceptible approaches of corruption. Americans!\u00a0never\u00a0resign that right. It is not very material whether your representatives are elected for one year or two\u2014but the\u202f<\/span>right<\/span><\/i>\u202fis the Magna Charta of your governments. For this reason, expunge that clause of the new constitution before mentioned, which gives Congress an influence in the election of their own body. The\u202f<\/span>time,\u00a0place<\/span><\/i>\u202fand\u202f<\/span>manner<\/span><\/i>\u202fof\u00a0chusing\u00a0senators or representatives are of little or no consequence to Congress. The number of members and time of meeting in Congress are\u00a0fixed;\u00a0but the\u202f<\/span>choice<\/span><\/i>\u202fshould rest with the several states. I repeat it\u2014reject the clause with decency, but with unanimity and firmness.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Excepting that\u00a0clause\u00a0the constitution is good\u2014it guarantees the\u202f<\/span>fundamental principles<\/span><\/i>\u202fof our several constitutions\u2014it guards our rights\u2014and while it vests extensive powers in Congress, it vests no more than are necessary for our union. Without powers lodged somewhere in a single body, fully competent to lay and collect equal taxes and duties\u2014to adjust controversies between different states\u2014to silence contending interests\u2014to suppress insurrections\u2014to regulate commerce\u2014to treat with foreign nations, our\u00a0confederation is a cobweb\u2014liable to be blown asunder by every blast of faction that is raised in the remotest corner of the United States.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Every motive that can\u00a0possibly influence\u00a0men ever to unite under civil government, now urges the unanimous adoption of the new constitution. But in America we are\u00a0urged to it\u00a0by a singular necessity. By the local situation of the several states\u202f<\/span>a few<\/span><\/i>\u202fcommand\u202f<\/span>all<\/span><\/i>\u202fthe advantages of commerce. Those states which have no advantages, made equal exertions for independence, loaded themselves with immense debts, and now are utterly unable to discharge them; while their richer neighbors are taxing them for their own benefit, merely because they\u202f<\/span>can<\/span><\/i>. I can prove to a demonstration that Connecticut, which has the heaviest internal or state debt, in proportion to its number of inhabitants, of any in the union, cannot discharge its debt, in proportion to its number of inhabitants, of any in the union, cannot discharge its debt, on any principles of taxation ever yet practiced. Yet the state pays in duties, at least 100,000 dollars annually, on goods consumed by its own people, but imported by New York. This sum, could it be saved to the state by an equal system of revenue, would enable that state to gradually sink its debt.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

New Jersey and some other states are in the same situation, except that their debts are not so large, in proportion to their wealth and population.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The boundaries of the several states were not drawn with a view to independence; and while this country was subject to Great Britain, they produced no commercial or political inconveniences. But the revolution has placed things on\u00a0a different\u00a0footing. The advantages of some states, and the disadvantages of others are so great\u2014and so materially affect the business and interest of each, that nothing but an equalizing system of revenue, that shall reduce the advantages to some equitable proportion, can prevent a civil war and save the national debt. Such a system of revenue is the\u202f<\/span>sine qua\u00a0non<\/span><\/i>\u202fof\u00a0public justice and\u00a0tranquillity.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It is absurd for a man to oppose the adoption of the constitution, because\u202f<\/span>he<\/span><\/i>\u202fthinks some part of it defective or exceptionable. Let every man be at liberty to expunge what\u202f<\/span>he<\/span><\/i>\u202fjudges to be exceptionable, and not a syllable of the constitution will survive the scrutiny. A painter, after executing a masterly piece, requested every spectator to draw a pencil mark over the part that did not please him; but to his surprise, he soon found the\u202f<\/span>whole piece<\/span><\/i>\u202fdefaced. Let every man examine the most perfect building by his\u202f<\/span>ownwhole<\/span><\/i>\u202ffor small deviations from the rules of architecture, and not a part of the\u202f<\/span>best<\/span><\/i>\u202fconstructed fabric would escape. But let\u202f<\/span>any<\/span><\/i>\u202fman take a\u202f<\/span>comprehensive view<\/span><\/i>\u202fof the whole, and he will be pleased with the general beauty and\u00a0proportions, and\u00a0admire the structure. The same remarks apply to the new constitution. I have no doubt that\u202f<\/span>every<\/span><\/i>\u202fmember of the late convention has exceptions to\u202f<\/span>some part<\/span><\/i>\u202fof the system proposed. Their constituents have\u00a0the same, and if\u202f<\/span>every<\/span><\/i>\u202fobjection must be removed, before we have a national government, the Lord\u00a0have\u00a0mercy on us.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Perfection is not\u00a0the\u00a0lot of humanity. Instead of censuring the small faults of the constitution, I am astonished that so many clashing interests have been reconciled\u2014and so many sacrifices made to the\u202f<\/span>general interest<\/span><\/i>! The mutual concessions made by the gentlemen of the convention, reflect the highest honor on their candor and liberality; at the same time, they prove that their minds were deeply impressed with a conviction,\u00a0the such\u00a0mutual sacrifices are\u202f<\/span>essential to our union<\/span><\/i>. They\u202f<\/span>must<\/span><\/i>\u202fbe made\u00a0sooner or later\u00a0by every state; or jealousies, local interests and prejudices will unsheathe the sword, and some Caesar or Cromwell will avail himself of our divisions, and wade to a throne through streams of blood.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It is not our duty as freemen, to receive the opinions of any men however great and respectable, without an examination. But when we reflect that some of the greatest men in America, with the venerable FRANKLIN and the illustrious WASHINGTON at their head;\u202f<\/span>some<\/span><\/i>\u202fof them the\u202f<\/span>fathers<\/span><\/i>\u202fand\u202f<\/span>saviors<\/span><\/i>\u202fof their country, men who have labored at the helm during a long and violent tempest, and guided us to the haven of peace\u2014and\u202f<\/span>all<\/span><\/i>\u202fof them distinguished for their abilities [and] their acquaintance with ancient and modern governments, as well as with the temper, the passions, the interests and the wishes of the Americans;\u2014when we reflect on these circumstances, it is impossible to resist impressions of respect, and we are almost impelled to suspect our own judgments, when we call into question any part of the system, which they have recommended for adoption. Not having the same means of information, we are more liable to mistake the nature and tendency of\u00a0particular articles\u00a0of the constitution, or the reasons on which they were admitted. Great confidence therefore should be reposed in the abilities, the zeal and integrity of that respectable body. But after all, if the constitution should, in its future operation, be found defective or inconvenient, two-thirds of both houses of Congress\u00a0or\u00a0the application of two-thirds of the legislatures, may open the door for amendments.\u00a0Such improvements may then be made, as experience shall dictate.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Let us then consider the\u202f<\/span>New Federal Constitution<\/span><\/i>, as it really is, an\u202f<\/span>improvement<\/span><\/i>\u202fon\u00a0the\u202f<\/span>best<\/span><\/i>\u202fconstitutions that the world ever saw. In the house of representatives, the people of America have an equal voice and suffrage. The choice of men is placed in the freemen or electors at large; and the frequency of elections, and the responsibility of the members, will\u00a0render\u00a0them sufficiently dependent on their constituents. The senate will be composed of older men; and while their regular dismission from office, once in six years, will preserve their dependence on their constituents, the duration of their existence will give firmness to their decisions, and temper the factions which must necessarily prevail in the other\u00a0branch. The president of the United States is elective, and what is a capital improvement on the best governments, the mode of\u00a0chusing\u00a0him excludes the danger of faction and corruption. As the supreme executive, he is invested\u00a0with\u00a0power to enforce the laws of the union and give energy to the federal government.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The constitution defines the powers of Congress; and every power not expressly delegated to that body,\u00a0remains\u00a0in the several state-legislatures. The sovereignty and the republican form of government of each state is guaranteed by the constitution; and the bounds of\u00a0jurisdiction\u00a0between the federal and respective state governments, are marked with precision. In theory, it has all the energy and freedom of the British and Roman governments, without their defects. In short, the privileges of freemen are interwoven into the feelings and habits of the Americans;\u202f<\/span>liberty<\/span><\/i>\u202fstands on the immoveable basis of a general distribution of property and diffusion of knowledge; but the Americans must cease to contend, to fear, and to hate, before they can realize the benefits of independence and government, or enjoy the blessings, which heaven has lavished, in rich profusion, upon this western world.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Public domain.\r\n\r\nSource:\u00a0 Teaching American History<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
An Examination\u00a0Into\u00a0the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution Proposed by the Late Convention Held at Philadelphia: With Answers to the\u00a0Principal Objections\u00a0That Have Been Raised Against the System. by Noah Webster (original attribution: “By A Citizen of America,”\u00a0 Oct 17, 1787) Of all the memorable eras that have marked the progress of men from the savage … Continue reading An Examination into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution<\/span> →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[102],"tags":[56,109,58],"class_list":["post-684","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-noah-webster","tag-democracy","tag-politics","tag-social-commentary"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/684","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=684"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/684\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":697,"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/684\/revisions\/697"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=684"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=684"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=684"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}