{"id":699,"date":"2026-07-28T16:49:47","date_gmt":"2026-07-28T16:49:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/?p=699"},"modified":"2026-09-05T20:08:06","modified_gmt":"2026-09-05T20:08:06","slug":"the-union-of-the-american-states-from-sketches-of-american-policy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/?p=699","title":{"rendered":"The Union of the American States, from Sketches of American Policy"},"content":{"rendered":"

The<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>Union<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>of<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>the<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>American<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>States<\/span><\/span> (1785)<\/span><\/h3>\n

by Noah Webster<\/p>\n

No\u00a0<\/span>PERSON\u00a0<\/span>can be said to enjoy civil liberty who has no share in legislation, and no per<\/span>son is secure in society unless the laws are known\u00a0and\u00a0respected.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In despotic governments, where the scepter is swayed by an individual, the ruler, whether denominated an emperor, a king, or a bashaw, having the sole right of making and executing laws, is the only person who enjoys any liberty. Every individual within his dominions is a slave. In this case, the interest of the individual, of the magistrate, and of the supreme power are all united, and government is\u00a0<\/i>of course\u00a0as active as possible. Hence the vigor and decision of military operations when the power of the general is without limitation.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Despotic power is not always tyrannical; in the hands of a mild prince, it may be favorable to the rights of the subject. But such is the depravity of human nature that it is madness in a people to vest such power in an individual. Denmark furnishes the only instance of absolute power conferred on an individual by the solemn act of the people; and it furnishes perhaps the only instance of absolute power that has not been abused.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

A limited monarchy, where the power of the sovereign is restrained by certain laws, is far preferable to despotism. But\u00a0<\/span>if\u00a0<\/span>a monarch has the power of making\u00a0<\/span>any\u00a0<\/span><\/i>laws, the people are so far slaves. However such power may be sanctified by time, custom, <\/span>or hereditary succession, the exercise of it,\u00a0in a single instance, is an act of tyranny. The king of Great Britain cannot make a single law binding upon his subjects, but he can defeat every bill that is proposed by Parliament. ls such a nation free? The English boast of their privileges, and with <\/span>some reason, when they draw a comparison between themselves and the vassals of a Polish nobleman. But when compared with the eternal immutable rights of man, their privileges shrink into insignificance. With what face can a nation boast of their liber<\/span>ties, when an individual of that nation can,\u00a0with a single expression, “the king will consider of it,” defeat any measure that the Parliament may adopt? Neither the title nor the dignities of royalty can make a king more honest or less fallible than another man; and upon the principles of natural right, any member of Parliament might as well negative an act of that body as the <\/span>king.\u00a0 A nation which is subject to the will of an individual is a nation of slaves, wheth<\/span>er that nation receives its laws from the arbitrary will of its sovereign, or whether the people reserve to themselves the right of making their own laws and give their sovereign full power to annihilate them at <\/span>pleasure. In either case a nation is at the mercy\u00a0of\u00a0an individual.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

An aristocracy is a form of government of all others the most to be dreaded; I mean where the right of legislation is vested in a hereditary nobility. The idea of being born a legislator is shocking to common sense, and the fact is a reproach to human nature. In such a government, the interest of the people is out of question. The interest of the supreme power, of the magistracy, and of the individual are here blended, and they are distinct and independent of the interest of the people. The consequence is that when these interests coincide in all the members of the legislature, they are combined to oppress their subjects, and when they clash, as often happens, the state is <\/span>torn with\u00a0dissensions\u00a0and civil war.<\/p>\n

From\u00a0the preceding\u00a0consideration,\u00a0<\/span>I\u00a0<\/span>deduce this definition of the most perfect practicable system of government; “a government where the right of making laws is vested in the greatest number of individuals, and the power of executing them in the <\/span>smallest number.” In large communities, the individuals are too numerous to assemble for the purpose of legislation; for which reason the people appear by substitutes or agents; persons of their own choice. A representative democracy seems therefore to be the most perfect system of government that is practicable on earth. . . .<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The theory of civil government exhibited in the preceding pages [is] designed as introductory to some remarks on the Ameri<\/span>can\u00a0states.<\/p>\n

A\u00a0tolerable\u00a0acquaintance\u00a0with\u00a0history\u00a0and<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>a small knowledge of the English settlements on this continent teach us that the <\/span>situation\u00a0of\u00a0these\u00a0states\u00a0is,\u00a0in\u00a0every\u00a0point\u00a0of\u00a0view, the reverse of what has been the infant situation of all other nations.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In the first place, our constitutions of civil government have been framed in the most enlightened period of the world. All other systems of civil polity have been begun in the rude times of ignorance and savage ferocity; fabricated at the voice of necessity, <\/span>without science and without experience. America, just beginning to exist in an advanced period of human improvement, has the science and the experience of all nations to direct her in forming plans of government. By this advantage she is enabled to supply the defects and avoid the errors incident to the policy of uncivilized nations, and to lay a broad basis for the perfection of human society. The legislators of the American states are neither swayed by a blind veneration for an independent clergy nor awed by the frowns of a tyrant. Their civil policy is or ought to be the result of the collected wisdom of all nations, and their religion, that of the Savior of man-kind. <\/span>If\u00a0<\/span>they do not establish and perpetuate the best systems of government on earth, it will be their own fault, for nature has given them every advantage they could desire.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In the next place, an equal distribution of landed property is a singular advantage as being the foundation of republican governments and the security of freedom. The New England states are peculiarly happy in this respect. Lands descend equally to all the heirs of the deceased possessor and perpetuities are entirely barred. In Connecticut the eldest male heir inherits two shares; this is a relic of ancient prejudices in favor of the rights of primogeniture, which the wisdom of succeeding legislatures will undoubtedly abolish. An act passed the legislature of New York a few years past, destroying and barring entailments and ordering that all intestate estates should descend to all the heirs in equal portions. No act was ever better timed or calculated to produce more salutary effects. The states of<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>Pennsylvania\u00a0and\u00a0North\u00a0Carolina\u00a0have<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>made it an article in their constitutions that no estates shall be perpetual. I am not sufficiently <\/span>acquainted with the constitutions of the other states to inform whether perpetuities are barred or not; but they may be avoided by a <\/span>common recovery,\u00a0<\/span><\/i>a fiction often practised in the English courts of law.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But although the southern states\u00a0possess\u00a0<\/span>too much of the aristocratic genius of European governments, yet it is probable that their future tendency will be toward republicanism. For if the African slave trade is prohibited, it must gradually diminish the large estates which are entirely cultivated by slaves, as these will probably decrease without recruits from Africa. And it is not probable that their place can be supplied by white people so long as vast tracts of valuable land are uncultivated, and poor people can purchase the fee of the soil.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But should the present possessors of lands continue to hold and cultivate them, still there is a new set of men springing up in the back parts of those states more hardy and independent than the peasants of the <\/span>low\u00a0countries\u00a0and more averse\u00a0to\u00a0aristocracy. The unhealthiness of the climate in the flatlands is a circumstance that will contribute to the rapid population of the moun<\/span>tains where the air is more salubrious.<\/p>\n

The idea, therefore, that the genius of the southern states is verging towards republicanism, appears to be supported by substantial reasons. It is much to be wished that such an idea might be well grounded, for <\/span>nature knows no distinctions, and government ought to know none, but such as are merited\u00a0by\u00a0personal virtues.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The confiscation of many large estates in every part of the union is another circumstance favorable to an equal distribution of property. The local situation of all the states and the genius of the inhabitants in most of them tend to destroy all the aristocratic ideas which were introduced from our parent country.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Necessarily connected with an equal distribution of landed property is the annihilation of all hereditary distinctions of rank. Such distinctions are inconsistent with the nature of popular governments. Whatever <\/span>pretensions some states have made to the\u00a0name\u00a0of\u00a0<\/span>republics;\u00a0<\/span><\/i>yet those that have permitted perpetual distinctions of property and hereditary titles of honor with a right<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>of legislation annexed certainly never deserved the name of popular governments; and they have never been able to preserve <\/span>their\u00a0freedom.\u00a0Wherever\u00a0two\u00a0or\u00a0more\u00a0orders of men have been established with hereditary privileges of rank, they have always quarreled till the power or intrigues of the superior orders have divested the people of all their civil liberties. In some countries they retain a show of freedom sufficient to <\/span>amuse them into obedience; but in most states, they have lost even the appearance of civil rights.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Congress, aware of the tendency of an unequal division of property and the evils of\u00a0<\/span>an aristocracy or a mixed form of government, have inserted a clause in the Articles of Confederation forever barring all titles of nobility in the American states; a precaution evincive equally of the foresight, the integrity, and the republican principles of that august body.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Another\u00a0circumstance\u00a0favorable\u00a0to\u00a0liberty<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>and peculiar to America is a most liberal plan of ecclesiastical policy. Dr. Price has anticipated most of my observations on this head. If sound sense is to be found on earth, it is in his reasoning on this subject. <\/span>The\u00a0American constitutions are the most\u00a0liberal in this particular of any on earth; and yet some of them have retained some badges of bigotry. A profession of the <\/span>Christian religion is necessary in the states to entitle a man to office. In some states, it is requisite to subscribe [to] certain articles of faith. These requisitions are the effect of the same abominable prejudices that have enslaved the human mind in all countries;<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>which\u00a0alone\u00a0have\u00a0supported\u00a0error\u00a0and\u00a0all<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>absurdities in religion. If there are any human means of promoting a millennial state of society, the only means are a general diffusion of knowledge and a free unlimited indulgence given to religious persuasions, without distinction and without preference. When this event takes place, and I believe it certainly will, the best religion will have the most advocates. Nothing checks the progress of truth like human establishments. Christianity spread with rapidity before the temporal powers interfered; but when the civil magistrate undertook to guard the <\/span>truth from error, its progress was obstructed, the simplicity of the gospel was corrupted with human inventions, and the efforts of Christendom have not yet been able to bring it back <\/span>to\u00a0<\/span>its primitive\u00a0purity.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The American states have gone far in assisting the progress of truth; but they have stopped short of perfection. They ought to have given every honest citizen an equal right to enjoy his religion and an equal title to all civil emoluments without obliging him to tell his religion. Every interference of the civil power in regulating opinion is an <\/span>impious attempt to take the business of the Deity out of His own hands; and every preference given to any religious denomination is so far slavery and bigotry. This is a\u00a0<\/span>blemish in our constitutions, reproachful in proportion to the light and knowledge of our legislators.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The general education of youth is an arti<\/span>cle in which the American states are superi<\/span>or to\u00a0all nations.\u00a0In\u00a0Great\u00a0Britain\u00a0the\u00a0arts\u00a0<\/span>and sciences are cultivated to perfection; but the instruction of the lowest classes of people is by no means equal to the American yeomanry. The institution of schools, particularly in the New England states, where the poorest children are instructed in reading, writing, and arithmetic at the public expense, is a noble regulation, calculated to dignify the human species.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This institution is the necessary consequence\u00a0of the genius of our governments; at\u00a0<\/span>the same time, it forms the firmest security\u00a0of our liberties. It is scarcely possible to reduce an enlightened people to civil or ecclesiastical tyranny. Deprive them of knowledge, and they sink almost insensibly in vassalage. Ignorance cramps the powers of the mind at the same time that it blinds men to all their natural rights. Knowledge enlarges the understanding, and at the same time it gives a spring to all the intellectual faculties which direct the deliberations of the cabinet and the enterprises of the field. A general diffusion of science is our best guard against the approaches of corruption, the prevalence of religious error, the intrigues of ambition, and against the open assaults of external foes.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In the southern\u00a0states\u00a0education is not sogeneral. Gentlemen of fortune give their children\u00a0a\u00a0most\u00a0liberal\u00a0education;\u00a0and\u00a0no part of America produces greater lawyers,\u00a0statesmen, and divines; but the body of the people are indifferently educated. In New England\u00a0it is rare\u00a0<\/span>to\u00a0<\/span>find a person who cannot read and write; but if I am rightly informed, the case is different in the southern <\/span>states. The education, however, of the common people in every part of America is equal to that of any nation; and the south<\/span>ern states, where schools have been much neglected, are giving more encouragement to literature.<\/p>\n

It is not my design to enumerate all the political and commercial advantages of this country; but only to mention some of the\u00a0<\/span>characteristic circumstances which distinguish America from all the kingdoms and states of which we have any knowledge.<\/span><\/p>\n

One further remark, however, which I cannot omit is that the people in America are necessitated by their local situation to be more sensible and discerning than nations which are limited in territory and confined to the arts of manufacture. In a populous country where arts are carried to great perfection, the mechanics are obliged to la<\/span>bor constantly upon a single article. Every art has its several branches; one of which employs a man all his life. A man who<\/span> makes heads of pins or springs of watches<\/span> spends his days in that manufacture and<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>never looks beyond it. This manner of fab<\/span>ricating\u00a0things\u00a0for\u00a0the\u00a0use\u00a0and\u00a0convenience\u00a0<\/span>of\u00a0life\u00a0is\u00a0the\u00a0means\u00a0of\u00a0perfecting\u00a0the\u00a0arts; but\u00a0it\u00a0cramps\u00a0the\u00a0human\u00a0mind\u00a0by\u00a0confining<\/span> all its faculties to a point. In countries thinly inhabited, or where people live principal<\/span>ly by agriculture as in America, every man <\/span>is in some measure an artist: he makes a variety of utensils, rough indeed, but such<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>as will answer his purpose; he is a husband<\/span>man in summer and a mechanic in winter;\u00a0<\/span><\/b>he travels about the country; he converses with a variety of professions; he reads public papers; he has access to a parish library and thus becomes acquainted with history and politics, and every man in New England is a theologian. This will always be the case in America, so long as there is a vast tract of fertile land to be cultivated which will occasion emigrations from the states already settled. Knowledge is diffused and genius roused by the very situation of <\/span>America.<\/p>\n

I have already mentioned three principles which have generally operated in combining the members of society under some supreme power: a standing army, religion, and fear of an external force. A standing army is necessary in all despotic governments. Religion, by which I mean supersti<\/span>tion, or human systems of absurdity, is an engine used in almost all governments, and has a powerful effect where people are kept <\/span>in ignorance. The fear of conquest is an infallible bond of union where states are surrounded by martial enemies. After people have been long accustomed to obey, what-ever be the first motive of their obedience, there is formed a habit of subordination which has an almost irresistible influence, and which will preserve the tranquillity of <\/span>government, even when coercion or the first\u00a0principle of\u00a0obedience\u00a0has ceased\u00a0to\u00a0operate. <\/span><\/p>\n

None of the foregoing principles can be the bond of union among the American states. A standing army will probably never exist in America. It is the instrument of tyranny and ought to be forever banished from free governments. Religion will have little <\/span>or no influence in preserving the union of\u00a0the states. The Christian religion is calculated to cherish a spirit of peace and harmony in society, but will not balance the influence of jarring interests in different governments. As to neighboring foes, we have none to <\/span>fear; and European nations are too wise or have too much business at home to think of<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>conquering these states.<\/p>\n

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We must therefore search for new princi<\/span>ples in modeling our political system. The <\/span>American constitutions are founded on principles\u00a0different\u00a0from\u00a0those\u00a0of\u00a0all\u00a0nations, and we must find new bonds of union to perpetuate\u00a0the\u00a0confederation.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In the first place, there must be a su<\/span>preme power at the head of the Union, vested with authority to make laws that respect the states in general and to compel obedience to those laws. Such a power <\/span>must exist in every society or no man is safe.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In order to understand the nature of such <\/span>a power, we must recur to the principles explained under the first head of these ob<\/span>servations.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

All\u00a0power\u00a0<\/span>is\u00a0<\/span><\/i>vested in the people. That this is their natural and unalienable right is a position that will not be disputed.\u00a0<\/span>The only question is how\u00a0<\/span>this power shall be exerted to effect the ends of government. If the\u00a0\u00a0people retain the power of executing<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>laws, we have seen how this division will destroy all its effect. Let us apply the definition of a perfect system of government to the American states. “The right of making laws for the United States should be vested in all their inhabitants by legal and equal representation, and the right of executing those laws committed to the smallest possi<\/span>ble number of magistrates, chosen annually by Congress and responsible to them for their administration.” Such a system of con<\/span>tinental government is perfect — it is practicable — and may be rendered permanent. I will <\/span>even venture to assert that such a system may have, in Iegislation, all the security of republican circumspection; and in administration, all the energy and decision of a<\/span> monarchy.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But must the powers of Congress be in<\/span>creased? This question implies gross ignorance of the nature of government. The question ought to be, must the American states be united? And if this question is decided <\/span>in the affirmative, the next question is<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>whether the states can be said to be united<\/span> w<\/span>ithout a legislative head? Or in other <\/span>words,\u00a0whether\u00a0thirteen\u00a0states\u00a0can\u00a0be\u00a0said\u00a0<\/span>to be united in government when each state reserves to itself the sole powers of legislation? The answer to all such questions is extremely easy. <\/span>If\u00a0<\/span>the\u00a0states\u00a0propose\u00a0to\u00a0<\/span>form and preserve a confederacy, there must be\u00a0a\u00a0supreme\u00a0head\u00a0in\u00a0which\u00a0the\u00a0power\u00a0of<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>all the states is united. <\/span><\/p>\n

There<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>must<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>be a supreme<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>head, clothed with the same power to make and enforce <\/span>laws <\/span>respecting <\/span>the <\/span>general <\/span>policy <\/span>of a<\/span>ll <\/span>the <\/span><\/span>states <\/span>as <\/span>the<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>legislatures<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>of<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>the<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>respective<\/span><\/span>\u00a0<\/span>states\u00a0have to\u00a0make laws binding on those\u00a0<\/span>states respecting their own internal police. The truth of this is taught by the principles of government, and confirmed by the experience of America. Without such a head, the states cannot be <\/span>united;\u00a0<\/span><\/i>and all attempts to conduct the measures of the continent will\u00a0<\/span>prove\u00a0<\/span><\/i>but\u00a0governmental\u00a0farces.\u00a0So\u00a0long\u00a0as any individual state has power\u00a0<\/span>to\u00a0<\/span>defeat the measures of the other twelve, our pretended\u00a0<\/span>union\u00a0is\u00a0but\u00a0a\u00a0name,\u00a0and\u00a0our\u00a0confederation\u00a0a cobweb.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

What, it will be asked, must the states relinquish their sovereignty and independence, and give Congress their rights of legislation? I beg to know what we mean by <\/span>United States? <\/span><\/i>If, after Congress have passed\u00a0<\/span>a\u00a0resolution\u00a0of a\u00a0general\u00a0tenor,\u00a0the\u00a0states\u00a0are still at liberty to comply or refuse, I must insist that they are not <\/span>united;\u00a0<\/span><\/i>they\u00a0<\/span>are as separate as\u00a0they\u00a0ever were, and Congress\u00a0is merely an advisory body. If people imagine that Congress ought to be merely a council of advice, they will\u00a0some time\u00a0or\u00a0other\u00a0discover their most egregious mistake.\u00a0<\/span>If\u00a0<\/span>3,000,000 people united under thirteen different heads are to be governed or <\/span>brought to act in concert by a <\/span>Resolve, that <\/span><\/i>it\u00a0be\u00a0recommended,\u00a0<\/span><\/i>I confess myself a stranger to history and to human nature. The very idea of uniting discordant interests and restraining the selfish and the wicked principles of men by advisory resolutions is too absurd to have advocates even among illiterate peasants. The resolves of Congress are always treated with respect, and during the late war they were efficacious. But their efficacy proceeded from a principle of common safety which united the interests of all the states; but peace has removed that principle, and the states comply with or refuse the requisitions of Congress just as they please.<\/span>\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The idea of each state preserving its <\/span>sov<\/span><\/i>ereignty and independence in their full latitude, and yet holding up the appearance of<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>a confederacy and a concert of measures, is a solecism in politics\u00a0that\u00a0will\u00a0sooner\u00a0or\u00a0later dissolve the pretended\u00a0union, or\u00a0work\u00a0<\/span>other mischiefs sufficient to bear conviction to every\u00a0mind.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But what shall be done? What system of government shall be framed to guard our <\/span>rights, to cement our union, and give energy to public measures? The answers to these questions are obvious and a plan of confederacy extremely easy. Let the government of the United States be formed upon the general plan of government in each of <\/span>the several states. Let us examine the constitution\u00a0of\u00a0Connecticut.<\/p>\n

The inhabitants of Connecticut form one body politic, under the name of the <\/span>Governor\u00a0and\u00a0Company\u00a0of\u00a0the\u00a0State\u00a0of\u00a0Connecti<\/span>cut. The whole body of freemen, in their collective capacity, is the supreme power of the state. By consent and firm compact or <\/span>constitution\u00a0this supreme power is delegated to representatives chosen in a legal manner and duly qualified. These representatives, properly assembled, make laws binding on the whole state; that is, the supreme power or state makes laws binding on itself. The supreme power and the subjects of that supreme power are the same body of men. As a collective body, the citi<\/span>zens are all an individual; as separate individuals, they are subjects as numerous as the citizens.<\/p>\n

When laws are enacted they are of a gen<\/span>eral tenor; they respect the whole state and cannot be abrogated but by the whole state. But the whole state does not attempt to execute the laws. The state elects a governor or<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>supreme magistrate and clothes him with the power of the whole state to enforce the laws. Under him a number of subordinate <\/span>magistrates, such\u00a0as judges\u00a0of courts, justices\u00a0of the peace, sheriffs, etc., are appointed to\u00a0<\/span>administer the laws in their respective departments. These are commissioned by the governor or supreme magistrate. Thus the whole power of the state is brought to a <\/span>single point; it is united in one person.<\/p>\n

If the representation of the freemen is equal and the elections frequent, if the mag<\/span>istrates are constitutionally chosen and responsible for their administration, such a government is of all others the most free and safe. The form is the most perfect on earth. While bills are depending before the <\/span>supreme power, every citizen has a right to oppose them. A perfect freedom of debate <\/span>is essential to a free government. But when a bill has been formally debated and is enacted into a law, it is the act of the whole state, and no individual has a right to resist it.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But, as it has been before observed, the acts of the supreme power must be general; it has therefore by a general law delegated<\/span>\u00a0 f<\/span>ull authority <\/span>to\u00a0<\/span>certain inferior corporations to make bylaws for the convenience of small districts and not repugnant to the laws of the state. Thus every town in Con<\/span>necticut is a supreme power for certain purposes and the cities are invested with extensive privileges. These corporations, for cer<\/span>tain purposes, are independent of the legislature; they make laws, appoint officers, and\u00a0<\/span>exercise jurisdiction within their own limits. As bodies politic, they are sovereign and independent; as members of a large community, they are mere subjects. In the same manner, the head of a family is sovereign in his domestic economy, but as a part of the state, he is a subject.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Let a similar system of government be extended to the United States. As towns <\/span>and cities are, as to their small matters, sovereign and independent, and as to their general concerns, mere subjects of the state; so let the several states, as to their own police, be sovereign and independent, but as to the <\/span>common concerns of all, let them be mere subjects\u00a0of\u00a0the\u00a0federal\u00a0head.\u00a0If\u00a0the\u00a0necessity\u00a0<\/span>of a union is admitted, such a system is the only means of effecting it. However independent each state may be and ought to be<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>in things that relate <\/span>to\u00a0<\/span>itself merely, yet as a part of a greater body it must be a subject <\/span>of that body in matters that relate to the whole. A system of continental government, thus organized, may establish and perpetuate the confederation without infringing the rights of any particular state. But the power of all the states must be reduced to a nar<\/span>row compass; it must center in a single body of men; and it must not be liable to be controlled or defeated by an individual state. The states assembled in Congress must have the same compulsory power in <\/span>matters that concern the whole as a man has in his own family, as a city has within the limits of the corporation, and as the legislature of a state has in the limits of that state, respecting matters that fall within their several jurisdictions.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

I beg to know how otherwise the states will be governed as a collective body? Every man knows by his own experience that even families are not to be kept in subordi<\/span>nation\u00a0by\u00a0recommendations and advice. How much less then will such flimsy things command the obedience of a whole contin<\/span>ent? They will not — they do not. A single state, by noncompliance with resolves of Congress, has repeatedly defeated the most salutary measures of the states proposed by Congress and acceded to by twelve out of thirteen.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

I will suppose for the present that a measure recommended by Congress and adopted by a majority of the legislatures should be really repugnant to the interest of <\/span>a single state, considered\u00a0in\u00a0its separate capacity. Would it be right for that state to oppose it? While the measure is in agitation it is the undoubted privilege of every state to oppose it by every argument. But when it is passed by the concurrence of a legal majority, it is the duty of every state to ac<\/span>quiesce.\u00a0So\u00a0far\u00a0from\u00a0resisting\u00a0the\u00a0measure, those very individuals who opposed it in debate ought to support it in execution. The reason is very plain: society and government can be supported on no other principles. The interest of individuals must always give place to the interest of the whole community. This principle of government is<\/span> not perfect, but it\u00a0is as perfect as any principle that can be carried into effect on this side [of] heaven.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It is for the interest of the American states either to be united or not. If their <\/span>union is unnecessary, let Congress be annihilated, or let them be denominated a council of advice and considered as such. They must then be stripped of their power of making peace and war and of a variety of prerogatives given them by the Articles of Confederation. In this case we ourselves and the states of Europe should know what kind of a being Congress is; what dependence can be placed on their resolves; what<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>is the nature of the treaties which they have made and the debts they have\u00a0contracted.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

But if the states are all serious in a design to establish a permanent\u00a0<\/span>union,\u00a0<\/span><\/i>let their sincerity be evinced by their public conduct.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Suppose the legislature of Rhode Island\u00a0had no power\u00a0<\/span>to\u00a0<\/span>compel obedience to its laws, but any town in that state had power to defeat every public measure. Could any laws be rendered effectual? Could it with propriety be called a state? Could it be said that there was any supreme power, or any government? Certainly not. Suppose the smallest town in Connecticut had power to defeat the most salutary measures of the\u00a0<\/span>state; would not every other town rise in arms against any attempt to exert such a power? They certainly would. The truth of the case is, where the power of a people is not united in some individual or small body of individuals, but continues divided among the members of a society, that power is nothing at all. This fact is clearly proved under the first head of these observations, and more clearly felt by our fatal experi<\/span>ence.<\/p>\n

The American states, as to their general <\/span>internal police, are not\u00a0united;\u00a0<\/i>there is no\u00a0supreme power at their head; they are in a perfect state of nature and independence as to each other; each is at liberty to fight its neighbor and there is no sovereign to call forth the power of the continent to quell the dispute or punish the aggressor. It is not in the power of the Congress — they have no command over the militia of the <\/span>states — each state commands its own, and should any one be disposed for civil war, the sword must settle the contest and the weakest be sacrificed to the strongest.\u00a0 <\/span><\/p>\n

It is now\u00a0in\u00a0the\u00a0power\u00a0of\u00a0the\u00a0states\u00a0to\u00a0<\/span>form a continental government as efficacious as the interior government of any particular\u00a0state.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The\u00a0general\u00a0concerns\u00a0of\u00a0the\u00a0continent may\u00a0be\u00a0reduced\u00a0to a\u00a0few\u00a0heads;\u00a0but\u00a0in\u00a0all the\u00a0affairs\u00a0that\u00a0respect\u00a0the\u00a0whole,\u00a0Congress<\/span> must have the same power to enact laws\u00a0and compel obedience throughout the continent as the legislatures of the several states have in their respective jurisdictions. If Congress have any power, they must have the whole power of the continent. Such a power would not abridge the sovereignty of <\/span>each state in any article relating to its own government. The internal police of each state would be still under the sole superintendence of its legislature. But in a matter that equally respects all the states, no individual state has more than a thirteenth part of the legislative authority, and consequently has no right to decide what measure shall or shall not take place on the continent. A majority of the states <\/span>must\u00a0<\/span><\/i>decide; our confederation cannot be permanent unless founded on that principle; nay more, the states cannot be said\u00a0<\/span>to\u00a0<\/span>be\u00a0<\/span>united\u00a0<\/span><\/i>till\u00a0such\u00a0a<\/span> principle is adopted in its utmost latitude. If <\/span>a single town or precinct could counteract the will of a whole state, would there be any government in that state? It is an established principle in government that the\u00a0<\/span>wilI\u00a0of the minority must submit to that of the majority; and a single state or a minority of states ought to be disabled to resist the will <\/span>of the majority, as much as a town or county in any state is disabled to prevent the execution\u00a0of\u00a0a statute law of the legislature.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

It is on this principle and\u00a0<\/span>this alone\u00a0<\/span><\/i>that a\u00a0<\/span>free state can be governed; it is on this principle alone that the American states can exist as a confederacy of republics. Either <\/span>the several states must continue separate, totally independent of each other, and liable to all the evils of jealousy, dispute, and civil dissension — nay, liable to a civil war upon any clashing of interests — or they must constitute a general head, composed of rep<\/span>resentatives from all the states, and vested\u00a0with the power of the whole continent to enforce their decisions. There is no other al<\/span>ternative. One of these events must inevitably\u00a0take place, and the revolution of a few years\u00a0will verify the prediction.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

I know the objections that have been urged by the supporters of faction, and perhaps by some honest men, against such a power at the head of the states. But the objections all arise from false notions of government or from a willful design to embroil the states. Many people, I doubt not, really suppose that such power in Congress would be dangerous to the liberties of the states. Such ought to be enlightened.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

There are two fundamental errors, very common in the reasonings which I have heard on the powers of Congress. The first <\/span>arises from the idea that our American constitutions are founded on principles similar to those of the European governments which have been called <\/span>free.\u00a0<\/span><\/i>Hence\u00a0people are\u00a0led\u00a0into\u00a0a\u00a0second\u00a0error,\u00a0which\u00a0is\u00a0that Congress\u00a0are\u00a0a\u00a0body\u00a0independent\u00a0of\u00a0their\u00a0<\/span>constituents and under the influence of a distinct interest.<\/p>\n

But\u00a0we\u00a0have\u00a0seen\u00a0before\u00a0that\u00a0our\u00a0systems<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>of civil government are different from all others, founded on different principles, <\/span>more favorable to freedom, and more secure against corruption.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

We have\u00a0<\/span>no perpetual distinctions of<\/span> property which might raise one class of men above another and <\/span>create\u00a0powerful\u00a0family connections and combinations against\u00a0our liberties. We suffer\u00a0<\/span>no hereditary offices<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>or titles<\/span> which might breed insolence and pride and give their possessors an opportunity to oppress their fellowmen. We are not under the direction of a bigoted clergy who <\/span>might rob us of the means of knowledge<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>and then inculcate on credulous minds what sentiments they please. Not a single office or emolument in America is held by prescription or hereditary right; but all at the disposal of the people, and not a man on the continent but drones and villains who has not the privilege of frequently choosing his legislators and impeaching his magistrates for maladministration. Such principles form the basis of our American governments –<\/span>– the first and\u00a0only governments\u00a0on<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>earth\u00a0that are founded\u00a0on\u00a0the true principles of\u00a0equal\u00a0liberty\u00a0and\u00a0properly\u00a0guarded\u00a0from<\/span> c<\/span>orruption.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The legislatures of the American states are the only legislatures on earth which are <\/span>wholly\u00a0<\/span><\/i>dependent\u00a0on\u00a0the\u00a0people\u00a0at\u00a0large;\u00a0and Congress is as dependent on the several\u00a0<\/strong><\/span>states as the legislatures are on their constituents. The members of Congress are chosen by the legislatures, removable by them at pleasure, dependent on them for subsis<\/span>tence, and responsible to their constituents for their conduct. But this is not all. After having been delegated three years, the con-federation renders them ineligible for the term of three years more, when they must return, mingle with the people, and become<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>private citizens. At the same time, their interest is the same with that of the people; for enjoying no exclusive privileges but what are temporary they cannot knowingly enact oppressive laws, because they involve <\/span>themselves, their families, and estates in all\u00a0the\u00a0mischiefs\u00a0that\u00a0result\u00a0from\u00a0such\u00a0laws.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

People, therefore, who attempt to terrify\u00a0us with apprehensions of losing our liberties <\/span>because other states have lost theirs, betray an ignorance of history and of the principles of our confederation. I will not undertake to say that the government of the American states will not be corrupted or degenerate into tyranny. But I venture to assert that <\/span>if\u00a0<\/span><\/i>it\u00a0<\/span><\/i>should, it will be the fault of the people. If the people continue <\/span>to\u00a0<\/span>choose their representatives annually and the choice of delegates to Congress should remain upon its present footing, that body can never become tyrants. A measure partially oppressive may be resolved upon, but while the principles of representation, which are always in the power of the people, remain <\/span>uncorrupted, such a measure can be of no long continuance. The best constitution of government may degenerate from its purity through a variety of causes; but the confed<\/span>eration of these states is better secured than\u00a0any government on earth, and less liable to corruption\u00a0from\u00a0any quarter.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

There is the same danger that the constitutions of the several states will become tyrannical as that the principles of federal government will be corrupted. The states in their collective capacity have no more reason to dread an uncontrollable power in Congress than they have, in their individual capacity, <\/span>to\u00a0<\/span>dread the uncontrollable power of their own legislatures. Their security in <\/span>both instances is an equal representation, the dependence, the responsibility, and the\u00a0<\/span>rotation of their representatives. These articles\u00a0constitute the basis of our liberties, and will be an effectual security, so long as the people are wise enough to\u00a0maintain\u00a0the principles\u00a0of\u00a0the confederation.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

I beg leave here to observe that a state was never yet destroyed by a corrupt or a wicked administration. Weakness and wickedness in the executive department may produce innumerable evils; but so long as\u00a0<\/span>the principles of a constitution remain uncorrupted, their vigor will always restore good order. Every stride of tyranny in the best governments in Europe has been effected by breaking over some constitutional\u00a0<\/span>barriers. But where a constitution is formed by the people and unchangeable but by their authority, the progress of corruption must be extremely slow, and perhaps tyranny can never be established in such government, except upon a general habit of indo<\/span>lence\u00a0and\u00a0vice.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

What do the states obtain by reserving to themselves the right of deciding on the propriety of the resolutions of Congress? The great advantage of having every measure\u00a0<\/span>defeated, our frontiers exposed to savages, the debts of the states unpaid and accumulating, national faith violated, commerce restricted and insulted, one state filching some interest from another, and the whole body linked together by cobwebs and shadows, the jest and the ridicule of the world. This is not a chimerical description; it is a literal <\/span>representation of facts as they now exist. One state found it could make some advantages by refusing the impost. Congress have reasoned with their legislature,-and by incontrovertible proofs have pointed out the impropriety of the refusal, but all to no purpose. Thus one-fiftieth part of the states <\/span>counteracts a measure that the other states suppose not only beneficial but necessary; a measure on which the discharge of our public debt and our national faith most obviously depend. Can a government thus feeble and disjointed answer any valuable purpose? C<\/span>an commutative justice between the states ever be obtained? Can public debts be discharged and <\/span>credit supported? Can America ever be respected by her enemies when one of her own states can, year after year, abuse her weakness with impunity? No, the American states, so celebrated for their <\/span>wisdom and valor in the late struggle for freedom and empire, will be the contempt of nations unless they can unite their force and carry into effect all the constitutional mea<\/span>sures of Congress, whether those measures respect themselves or foreign nations.<\/p>\n

The Articles of Confederation ordain that <\/span>the public expenses shall be defrayed out of<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>a\u00a0common treasury. But where is this treasury? Congress prescribe a measure for supplying this treasury; but the states do not approve of the measure; each state will take\u00a0<\/span>its own way\u00a0and\u00a0its own time,\u00a0and perhaps\u00a0not supply its contingent of money at all. Is this an adherence to the Articles of our un<\/span>ion?\u00a0<\/span><\/i>It certainly is not; and the states that refuse a compliance with the general mea<\/span>sures of the continent would, under a good government, be considered as rebels.\u00a0Such a\u00a0<\/span>conduct amounts to treason, for it strikes at the foundation\u00a0of government.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Permit me to ask every candid American how society could exist if every man assumed the right of sacrificing <\/span>his neighbor’s property to his own interest? Are there no <\/span>rights to be relinquished, no sacrifices to be<\/span> made for the sake of enjoying the\u00a0 benefits <\/span>of civil government? <\/span>If\u00a0<\/span>every town in Rhode Island, even the smallest, could annihilate every act of the legislature, could that state <\/span>exist? Were such a selfish system to prevail generally, there would be an end of government and civil society would become a curse. A social state would be less eligible <\/span>than a savage state, in proportion as knowledge would be increased and knaves multiplied. Local inconveniences and local interests never ought to disappoint a measure of general utility. If there <\/span>is not power enough in government to remedy these evils by obliging private interests to give way to public, discord will pervade the state, and <\/span>terminate in a revolution. Such a power must exist somewhere, and if people will quarrel with good government, there are innumerable opportunities for some daring\u00a0<\/span>ambitious genius to erect a monarchy on civil dissensions. In America there is no danger of an aristocracy; but the transition from\u00a0popular\u00a0anarchy\u00a0to\u00a0monarchy\u00a0<\/span>is very natural and often very easy. If these states have any change of government to fear, it <\/span>is a monarchy. Nothing but the creation of a sovereign power over the whole, with authority to compel obedience to legal mea<\/span>sures, can ever prevent a revolution in favor of one monarchy or more. This event may <\/span>be distant, but is not the less certain. America\u00a0has\u00a0it\u00a0now\u00a0in\u00a0her\u00a0power\u00a0to\u00a0create\u00a0a\u00a0supreme power over the whole continent sufficient to answer all the ends of government without abridging the rights or destroying the sovereignty of a single state. But should the extreme jealousy of the states prevent the lodgment of such a power in a body of men chosen by themselves and removable at pleasure, such a power will inevitably create itself in the course of events.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The confederation has sketched out a <\/span>most excellent form of continental government. The ninth article recites the powers of Congress, which are perhaps nearly suffi<\/span>cient to answer the ends of our Union, were there any method of enforcing their <\/span>resolutions. It is there said what powers shall be exercised by Congress; but no penalty is annexed to disobedience. What purpose would the laws of a state answer if they might be evaded with impunity? And if there were no penalty annexed to a breach of them? A law without a penalty is <\/span>mere\u00a0advice;\u00a0<\/i>a magistrate without the powerof punishing is a\u00a0<\/span>cipher.\u00a0<\/span><\/i>Here is the\u00a0<\/span>great\u00a0defect\u00a0<\/span><\/i>in the articles of our federal government. Unless Congress can be vested with the same authority to compel obedience to their resolutions that a legislature in any state has to enforce obedience to the laws of that state, the existence of such a body is<\/span> entirely needless and will not be of long duration.\u00a0I repeat\u00a0what\u00a0I have\u00a0before\u00a0said. The idea of governing thirteen states and\u00a0<\/span>uniting their interests\u00a0by\u00a0mere resolves and recommendations, without any penalty an<\/span>nexed to a noncompliance, is a ridiculous farce, a burlesque on government, and a reproach\u00a0to America.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Let Congress be empowered to call forth\u00a0<\/span>the\u00a0force of the continent, if\u00a0necessary, to carry into effect those measures which they have a right to frame. Let the president be, <\/span>ex officio<\/em>,\u00a0supreme magistrate, clothed with\u00a0authority\u00a0to\u00a0execute\u00a0the\u00a0laws\u00a0of\u00a0Congress,\u00a0in the same manner as the governors of the states are to execute the laws of the states.\u00a0Let the superintendent of finance have the power of receiving the public monies and\u00a0<\/span>issuing warrants for collection in the manner the treasurer has in Connecticut. Let every executive officer have power to enforce\u00a0the laws which fall within his province. At the same time, let them be accountable for their administration. Let penalties be an<\/span>nexed to every species of maladministration and exacted with such rigor as is due to justice and the public safety. In short, let the whole system of legislation be the peculiar right of the delegates in Congress who are always under the control of the people; and let the whole administration be vested in magistrates as few as possible in number, and subject to the control of Congress only. Let every precaution be used in <\/span>framing <\/span><\/i>laws, but let no part of the subjects be able <\/span>to\u00a0<\/span>resist\u00a0the execution.\u00a0Let\u00a0the\u00a0people\u00a0keep, and\u00a0<\/span>forever\u00a0keep,\u00a0<\/span><\/i>the\u00a0sole\u00a0right\u00a0of\u00a0legislation\u00a0<\/span>in their own representatives, but divest themselves wholly of any right to the ad<\/span>ministration. Let every state reserve its sovereign right of directing its own internal affairs, but give to Congress the sole right of conducting the general affairs of the continent. Such a plan of government is practicable; and, I believe, the only plan that will preserve the faith, the dignity, and the <\/span>union of these American states.<\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

Public domain.\r\n\r\nSource:<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/span>Sketches<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>of<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>American<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>Policy,<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/span>1785.[<\/span>Harry<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/span>R.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/span>Warfel,<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>ed.,<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>New<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>York<\/span>,<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>1937,<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/span>pp.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/span>3-<\/span>48]<\/span><\/span><\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
The\u00a0Union\u00a0of\u00a0the\u00a0American\u00a0States (1785) by Noah Webster No\u00a0PERSON\u00a0can be said to enjoy civil liberty who has no share in legislation, and no person is secure in society unless the laws are known\u00a0and\u00a0respected.\u00a0 In despotic governments, where the scepter is swayed by an individual, the ruler, whether denominated an emperor, a king, or a bashaw, having the sole … Continue reading The Union of the American States, from Sketches of American Policy<\/span> →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[102,1],"tags":[13,56,60,58],"class_list":["post-699","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-noah-webster","category-uncategorized","tag-constitution","tag-democracy","tag-slavery","tag-social-commentary"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/699","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=699"}],"version-history":[{"count":9,"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/699\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":710,"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/699\/revisions\/710"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=699"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=699"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/hartfordlit.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=699"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}