The Union of the American States
by Noah Webster
No PERSON can be said’ to enjoy civil liberty who has no share in legislation, and no per-son is secure in society -unlesS the laws are known and respected.
In despotic governments, where the scep-ter is swayed by an individual, the ruler, whether denomin.ated an emperor, a king, or a bashaw [pasha], having the sole right of making and executing laws, is the only person who enjoys any liberty. Every indi-vidual within his dominions is a slave. In this case, the interest of the individual, of the magistrate, and of the supreme power are all united, and government is of course as active as possible. Hence the vigor and decision of military operations when the power of the general is without lim\tation.
Despotic power is not ‘always tyrannical; in the hands of a mild prince, it may be favorable to the rights of the subject. But such is the depravity of human nature that it is madness in a people to vest such power in an individual. Denmark furnishes the only instance of absolute power conferred on an individual by the solemn act of the people; and it furnishes perhaps the only in-stance of absolute power that has not been abused.
A limited monarchy, where the ,power of the sovereign is restrained by certain laws, is far preferable to despotism. But if a mon-arch has the power of making any laws, the people ate so far slaves. However such power may be sanctified by time, custom, or hereditary succession, the exercise of i_t, in a sillgle _instance, is an act of tyranny. The king of Great Britain cannot make a single law binding upon his subjects, but he can defeat every bill that is proposed by Parliament. ls such a nation free? The En-glish boast of their privileges,- and with some reason, when they draw a Comparison between themselves and the vassals of a Polish nobleman. But when compared with the eternal immutable rights of man, their privileges shrink into insignificance. With what face can a nation boast of their liber-ties, when an individual of that nation can, with a single expression, “the king will con-sider of it,” defeat any measure that th_e Parliament may adopt? Ne1tl1er the title nor the dignities of royalty can make a king more honest or less fallible than another man; and upon the principles of natural right, any member of Parliament might as well negative an act of that body as the
king. A nation which is subject to the will of an individual is a nation of slaves, wheth-er that nation receives ‘its laws from the ar-bitrary will of its sovereign, or whether the people r_;serve to themselves the right of making their own laws and give their sov-ereign full power to annihilate them at pleasure. In either case- a nation is at the mercy of an individual.
An aristocracy is a form of government of all others the most to be dreaded; I mean where the right of legislation is vested in a hereditary nobili\J. The idea of being born a legislator is shocking to common sense, and the fact is a reproach to human nature. In such• a government, the interest of the people is out of question. The interest of the supreme power, of the magistracy, and of the ind_ividual are here blended, and they are distinct and independent of the interest of the people. The consequence is that when _these interests coincide in all the members of the legislature, they are com-bined to oppress their subjects, and when they clash, as -often happens, the state is torn with dissensions and civil war.
From the preceding consideration, I de-duce this definition of the most perfect practicable system. of government; “a gov-ernment where the right of making laws is vested in the greatest number of individuals, and the power of executing them in the smallest number.” In large communities, the individuals are too numerous to assemble for the purpose of legislation;” for which reason the people appear by substitutes or agents; persons of their own choice. A rep-resentative democracy seems therefore to be the most perfect system of government that is practicable on earth. . . .
Th_e theory of civil government exhibited in the preceding pages [is] designed as in-troductory to some remarks on the Ameri-can states.
A tolerable acquaintance with history and
a small knowledge of the English settle-ments on this continent teach us that the situation of these states is, in every point of
view, the reverse of what has been the in-fant situation of all other nations.
In the first place, our constitutions of civil government have been framed in the most enligh_tened period of the world. All other systems of civil polity have been begun in the rude times of ignorance and savage fe-roci\Y; fabricated at the voice of necessity, without science and without experience. America, just beginning to exist in an ad-vanced period of human improvement, has the science and the experience of all nations to direct her in forming . plans of govern-ment. By this advantage she is enabled to supply the defects and avoid the errors inci-dent to the policy of uncivilized nations, and to lay a broad basis for the perfection of human society. The legislators of the American states are. neither swayed by a blind veneration for an independent clergy nor awed by the frowns of a tyrant. Their civil policy is or ought to be the result of the collected wisdom of all nations, and their religion,. that of the Savior of man-kind. If they do not establish and perpetu-ate the best sy;tems of government on earth, it will be their own fault, for nature has given them every advantage they could desire.
In the next place, an equal distribution �f landed property is a singular advantage as being the foundation of republican: govern-ments and the security of freedom. The New England states are peculiarly happy in this respect. Lands lescend equally to all the heirs of the deceased possessor and perpetuities are entirely barred. In Connect-icut the eldest male heir inherits two shares; this is a relic of ancient prejudices in favor of the rights of primogeniture, which the wisdom of succeeding legislatures will un-doubtedly abolish. An act passed the legisla-ture of New York• a few years past, de-stroying and barring entailments and order-ing that all intestate estates should descend to all the heirs in equal portions. No act was ever- better timed or calculated to pro-duce more salutary effects. The states of
Pennsylvania and North Carolina have
made it an article in their constitutions that no �;tat�; ;-hall I;� perpetua!:. I am-noi suffi-
ciently acquainted with the constitutions of the &ther states to inform whether perpetui-ties are barred or not; but they may be avoided by a common recovery, a fiction of-ten practised in the English courts of law.
But although the southern states possess too much of the aristocratic genius of Euro-pean governments, yet it is probable that their future tendency will be toward repub-licanism. For if the African slave. trade is prohibited, it must gradually diminish the large estates which are entirely cultivated by slaves, as these will probably decrease with-out recruits from Africa. And it is not prob-able that their place· can be supplie·d by white people so long as vast tracts of valu-able land are uncultivated, and poor people can purchase the fee of the soil.
But should the present possessors of lands continue to hold arrd cultivate them, still there is a new set of men springing up in the back parts of those states more hardy and independent than the peasants of the low countries and more averse to aristocra-cy. The unhealthiness of the climate in the flatlands is a circumstance that will contrib-ute to the rapid population of the moun-tains where the air is more- salubrious.
The idea, therefore, that the genius of the southern states is verging towards republi-canism, appears to be supported by substan-tial reasons. It is much to be wished that such an idea might be well grounded, for nature knows no distin·ctions, ‘and govern-ment ought to know none, but such as are merited by personal virtues.
The confiscation of many large estates in every part of the union is another circum-stance favorable to an equal distribution of property. The local situation of all the states and the genius of the inhabitants in most of them tend to destroy all the aristocr�tic ideas which were introduced from our par-ent country.
Necessarily connected with an equal dis-tribution of landed property is the annihila-tion of all hereditary distinctions of rank. Such distinctions are inconsistent with the nature of popular governments. Whatever pretensions some states have made to the name of republics; yet those that have per-mitted perpetual distinctions of property and hereditary titles of honor with a right
of legislation annexed certainly never de-served the name of popular governments; and they have never been able to preserve their freedom. Wherever two or more or-ders of men have been established with he-reditary privileges of rank, they have always quarreled till the power or intrigues of the superior orders have divested the people of all their civil liberties. In some countries they retain a show of freedom ·sufficient to amuse them into obedience; but in most states, they have lost even the appearance of civil rights.
Congress, aware of the tendency of an unequal division of property and the evils of an aristocracy or a mixed form of govern-ment, havesf> inserted a clause in the Articles of Confederation forever barring all titles of nobility in the American states; a precaution e,rincive equally of the foresight, the integri-ty, and the republican principles of that au-gust body.
Another circumstance favorable to liberty
and peculiar to America is a most liberal plan of ecclesiastical policy. Dr. Price has anticipated most of my observations on this head. If sound sense is to be found on earth, it is in his reasoning on this subject.
. The American constitutions are the most liberal in this particular of any on earth; and yet some of them have retained some badges of bigotry. A profession of the Christian religion is necessary in the .states to entitle a man to office. In some states, it is requisite to subscribe [to] certain articles of faith. These requisitions are the effect of the same abominable prejudices that have enslaved the human mind in all countries;
which alone have supported error and all
absurdities in religion. If there are any hu-man .means of promoting a .millennial state of society, the only means are a general dif-fusion of knowledge and a free unlimited indulgence given to religious persuasions, without distinction and without preference. When this event takes place, and I believe it certainly will, the best religion will have the most advocates. Nothing· checks the progress of truth like human establishments. fhristianity spread with rapidity before the temporal. powers interfered; but when the civil magistrate undertook to guard the truth from error, its progress was obstruct-ed, the simplicity of the gospel was corrupt-ed with human inventions, and the efforts of Christendom have not yet been able to bring it back to its primitive purity.
The American states have gone far in as-sisting the progress of truth; but they have stopped short of perfection. They ought to have given every honest. citizen an equal right to enjoy his religion and an equal title to all civil emoluments without obliging him to tell his religion. Every interference’ of the civil power in regulating opinion is an impious attempt to take the business of the Deity out of His own hands; and every preference given to any religious denomina-tion is so far slavery and bigotry. This is a bleIIlish in our constitutions, repro.achful in proportion to the light and knowledge of our legislators.
The general education of youth is an arti-
cle in which the American states are superi-
_or to all nations. In Great Britain the arts and sciences are cultivated to perfection; but the instruction of the lowest classes of people is by no means equal to the Ameri-can yeomanry. The institution of schools, particularly in the New England states, where the poorest children are instructed in reading, writing, and arithmetic at the pub-lic expense, is a noble regulation, calculated to dignify the human species.
This institution is the necessary conse-
quence of the genius of our governments; at the same time, it forms the firmest security of our liberties. It is scarcely possible to reduce an enlightened people to civil or ec-clesiastical tyranny. Deprive them of knowl-edge, and they sink almost insensibly in vas-salage. Ignorance cramps the powers of the mind at the same time that it blinds men to all thei_r natural rights. Knowledge enlarges the understanding, and at the same time it gives a spring to all the intellectual faculties which direct the deliberations of the cabinet and the enterprises of.the field. A general diffusion of science is our best guard against the approaches of corruption, the prevalence of religious error, the intrigues of ambition, and against the open assaults of external foes.
In the southern states education is not so general. Gentlemen of fortune give their children a most liberal education; and no part of America produces greater lawyers, statesmen, and divines; but the body of the people are indifferently educated. In New England it is rare to find a person who can-not read and write; but if I am rightly in-formed, the case is different in the southern states. The education, however, of the com-mon people in every part of America is equal to that of any nation; and the south-ern states, where scho_ols have been· much neglected, are giving_ more encouragement to literature.
It is not my design to enumerate all the political and commercial advantages of this country; but only to men_tion some of the characteristic circumstances which distin-guish America from all the kingdoms and states of which we have any knowledge..
One further remark, however, which I cannot omit is that the people in America are necessitated by their local situation to be more sensible and discerning than na-tions which are limited in territory and con-fined to the arts of manufacture. In a popu-lous country where arts are carried to great perfection, the mechanics are obliged to la
bor constantly upon a single article. Every arr- has ·its several branches; one of· which employs a _man all his life. A man who
l mak’7 heads of pins or springs of watches
‘ spends his days in that manufacture and
never looks beyond it. This manner of fab-
I ricating things for the use and convenience
of life is the means of perfecting the arts; but it cramps the human mind by confining
l all its faculties to a point. In countries thin-ly inhabited, or where people live principal-
ly by agriculture as in America, every man I is in some measur� an artist: he makes ·a variety of utensils, rough indeed, but such
as will answer his purpose; he is a husband-man in summer and a mechanic in winter; he travels about the country; he converses with a variety of professions; he reads pub-lic papers; he has access to a parish library and thus becomes acquainted with history and politics, and every man in New En-gland is a theologian. This will always be the case in America, so long as there is a vast tract of fertile land to be cultivated which will occasion emigrations from the states already settled. Knowledge is diffused and genius roused by the very situation of America. ‘
I have already mentioned three principles which have generally operated in combining the members of society under some su-preme power: a standing army, religion, and fear of an external force. A standing army is necessary in all despotic govern-ments. Religion, by which I mean supersti-tion, or human·systems of absurdity, is an engine used in almost all governments, and has a powerful effect where people are kept in ignorance. The fear of conquest is an in-fallible bond of union where states are sur-rounded by martial enemies. After people have been long accustomed to obey, what-ever be the first motive of their obedience, there is formed a habit of subordination which has an almost irresistible influence, and which will preserve the tranquillity of government, even when coercion or the first
principle of obedience has ceased to operate. None of the foregoing principles can be the bond of union among the American states. A standing army will probably never exist in America. It is the instrument of tyr-anny and ought to be forever banished from free governments. Religion will have little or no influence in preserving the union of the states. The Christian religion is calculat-ed to cherish a spirit of peace and harmony in society, but will not balance the influence of jarring interests in ,different governments. As to neighboring foes,. we have none to fear; and European nations are too wise or have too much business at home to think of
/colltjUCfring these states.
- We must therefore search for new princi-
- ples-in ‘modeling our political system: The American constitutions are founded on prin-ciples different from those of all nations, and we must find new bonds of union to perpetuate the confederation.
In the first place, there must be a su-
preme power at the head of the Union, vested with authority to make laws that re-spect the st’ites in general and to compel obedience to those laws. Such a power must exist in every society or no man is safe.
In orde, to understand the nature of such a power, ..we must recur to the principles explained under the first head of these ob-servations.
All power is vested in the peop[e,,–‘J’.l,at
this is their nafora:r-and \unalie-�abl�· right-is a position that will not ·be disputed. The only question is how this power shall be exerted to effect the ends of government. If the people retain the power of. executing
laws, we have seen. how this division will destroy all its effect. Let us apply the defini-tion of a perfect system of government to the American states. “The right of making laws for the United States should be vested in all their inhabitants by legal and equal representation, and the right of executing those laws committed to the smallest possi
ble number of magistrates, chosen annually by Congress and responsible to them for their administration.” Such a system of con-tinentai government is perfect – it is prac-ticable – and may be rendered permanent. I will’ even venture: to assert that such a sys-tem may have,..in I’egislation,. all the security of republican ,circumspection; and in admin-istration, all the -energy a;,d decision of a
,1 monarchy.
But must the powers of Congress be in-
creased? This question implies gross igno-rance of the nature of government. The question ought to be, must the American states be united? And if this questi�rt-is de-
dc!;i in the affirmative, the next question is
whether the states can be said to be united
- without .a legislative head? Or in other i words, whether thirteen states can be said to be united in government when each state reserves to itself the sole powers of legisla-tion? The answer to all such questions is extremely easy. If the states propose to form and pre.Serve a confederacy, there must be a supreme head in which the power of
all the states is united. There must be a supreme head, clothed with the same power to make and enforce laws respecting the general policy of all the states as the legislatures of the respective
states have to make laws binding on those states respecting their own internal police. The trnth of this is taught by the principles of government, and confirmed by _the expe-rience of America. Without such a head, the states cannot be united; and all attempts to conduct the measures of the continent will prove but governmental farces. So long as any individual state has power to defeat the measures of the other twelve, our pretended union is but a name, and our confederation a cobweb.
/ What, it will be asked, must the states relinquish their sovereignty and indepen-dence, and give Congress their rights of leg-islation? I beg to know what we mean by United States? If, after Congress have passed
a resolution of a general tenor, the states are still at liberty to com ply or refuse, I must insist that they are not united; they are as separate as they ever were, and Con-gress is merely an advisory body. If people imagine that Congress ought to be merely a council of advice, they will some time or other discover their most egregious mistake. If 3,000,000 people united under thirteen different heads are to be governed or
brought to act in concert by a Resolve, that , , ,
it be recommended, I confess myself a stran-ger to history and to human nature. The very idea of uniting discordant interests and restraining the selfish and the wicked princi-ples of men by advisory resolutions is too absurd to have advocates even among illit-erate peasants. The resolves of Congress are always treated with respect, and during the late war they were efficacious. But their ef-ficacy proceeded from a principle of com-mon safety which united the interests of all the states; but peace has removed that prin-ciple, and the states comply with or refuse the requisitions of Congress just as they ,. please. \
The idea -<>f each state preserving its sov-ereignty ·and independence in their full ·lati-tude, and yet holding up the appearance of
aconfederacy_
_and a concert of rrieasure·s, is
.s’6I�dsm· in politics that will sooner or lat-er dissolve the pretended union, or work other mischiefs sufficient to bear conviction to every mind.
But what shall be done? What system of government shall b� framed to guard our rights, to cement our union, and give ener-gy to public measures? The answers t.o these questions are obvious and a ·plan of confederacy extremely easy. Let the govern-ment of the United States be formed upon the general plan of government in each of the several states. Let us examine the consti-
tution of Connecticut.
The inhabitants of Connecticut form one body politic, under the name of the Gover-nor and Company of the State of Connecti
cut. The whole body of freemen, in their collective capacity, is the supreme power of the .state. By consent and firm compact or copstitution1 this supreme power is dele-gated t:<J representatives chosen in a legal manner and duly qualified. These represen-tatives., properly assem bled, make laws binding on the whole state; that is, the su-preme power or state makes laws binding on itself. The supreme power and the sub-jects of that supreme power are the same body of men. As a collective body, the citi-z.ens are all an individual;· as separate indi-viduals, they are subjects as numerous as the citizens.
When laws are enacted they are of a gen-
eral tenor; they respect the whole state and cannot be abrogated but by the whole state. But the whole state does not attempt to ex-ecute the laws. The state elects a governor OJ; supreme magistrate and clothes him with the power of the whole state to enforce the laws. Under him a number of subordinate magistrateS, such as Judges of courts, justices of the peace, sheriffs, etc., are appointed to administer the laws in their respective de-partments. These are commissioned by the governor or supreme magistrate. Thus the who!, power of the state is brought to a single poip.t; it is united in one person.
If the . representation of the freemen is equal an_d the elections frequent, if the mag-istrates are constitutionally chosen and re-sponsible for their administration, such a government is of all others the most free and safe. The form is the most perfect on earth. While bills are depending before the supreme power, every citizen has a right to oppose them_. A perfect freedom of debate is essential to a free government. But when ‘a bill has been formally debated and is en-acted into a law, it is the act of the whole state, and no individual has a right to resist it.
But, as it has been before observed, the acts of the supreme power must be general; it has therefore by a general law delegated
full _authority to certain inferior corporations to make bylaws for the convenience of small districts and not repugnant to the laws of the state. Thus every town in Con-necticut is a supreme power for certain pur-poses and the cities are invested with exten-
sive privileges. These corporations, for cer-
tain purposes, are independent of the legis-lature; they make laws, appoint officers, and exercise jurisdiction within their own limits. As bodies politic, they are sovereign and in-dependent; as members of a large commu-nity, they are mere subjects. In the same manner, the head of a family is sovereign in his .domestic economy, but as a part of the state, he is a subject.
Let a similar system of government be extended to the United States. As town\,. and cities are, as to their small matters, sov-, ereign and independent, and as to their gen-eral concerns, mere subjects of the state; so let the several states, as to their own police, be sovereign and independent, but as to the common concerns of all, let them be mere subjects of the federal head. If the necessity of a union is <;.dmitted, such a system is the only means of effecting it. However inde-pendent each state may be and ought to be
in things that relate to itself merely, yet as a1 part of a greater body it must be a subject·
of that body in matters -that relate to the whole. A system of continental government, thus organized, may establish and perpetu-ate the confederation without infringing the rights of any particular state…But the power of all the states must be reduced to a nar-row compass; it must center in a :single body of men; and it must not be liable to be controlled or defeated by an individual state. The states assembled in Congress must have the same compulsory power in matters that concern the whole as a man has in his own family, as a city has within the limits of the corporation, and as the leg-islature of a state has in the limits of that state, respecting matters that fall within iheir several jurisdictions.
I beg Jo know ho,v ot�<erwise the states will be governed as a collective body? Ev-ery man knows by his own experience that even famllies are not to be kept in subordi-nation by recommendations and advice. How much less then will such flimsy things command the obedience of a whole·conti-
.1ent? They will not – they do not. A sin-gle state, by noncompliance with resolves of Congress, has repeatedly defeated the most salutary measures of the states proposed by Congress and acceded to by twelve out of thirteen.
I will suppose for the present that a mea-sure recommended by Congres,s and adopted by a majority of the legislatures shi:mld be really repugnant to the interest of a single state, considered in its separate ca-pacity. Would it be right for that state to oppose it? While the measure is in agitation it is the undoubted privilege of every state to oppose it by every argument. But when it is passed by the concurrence of a legal majority, it is the duty of every state to ac-quiesce. So far from resisting the measure,
. chose very individuals who opposed it in ‘debate ought to support it in execution. The reason is very plain: society and gov-ernment can be supported on no other prin-ciples. The interest of individuals must al-ways give place to the interest of the whole c_ommu.nity. This principle of government is
\ not perff:str’but it is as perfect as any princi-p1erliat can be carried into effect on this side [of] heaven.
It is for the interest of the American states either to be united or not. If their union is unnecessary, let Congress be anni-hilated, or let them be denominated a coun-cil of advice and considered as such. They must then be stripped of their power of making peace and war and of a variety of prerogatives given them by the Articles of Confederation. In this case we ourselves and the states of Europe should know what kind of a being Congress is; what depen-dence can be placed on their resolves; what
is the nature of the treaties which they have made and the debts they have contracted.
But if the states are all serious in a design to ‘establish a permanent union, let their sin-cerity be evinced by their public conduct.
Suppose the legislature of Rhode Island had no power to compel obedience to its laws, but any town in that state had power to defeat every public measure. Could any laws be rendered effectual? Could it with propriety be called a state? Could it be said that- there was any supreme power, or any government? Certainly not. Suppose the smallest town in Connecticut had power to defeat the most salutary measures of the state; would not every other town rise in arms against any attempt to exert such a power? They certainly would. The truth· of the case is, where the power of a people is not united in some individual or small body ohndividuals, but continues divided among the members of a society, that power is nothing at all. This fact is clearly proved under the first head of these observations, and more clear.ly fel( by; our fatal experi-ence.
The Americ’an states, as to their general internal police,· are not united; there is no supreme power at their head; they are in a perfect state of nature and independenc.e as. to each other: .each is at liberty to fight its neighbor and there is no sovereign to call forth the poweY’bf the continent to• quell the dispute or punish the aggresso�:·1t is not in the power of the Congress _:.: they have no command over the militia of the states – each state commands its own!• arid should any one be disposed for civil war, the swo;d• must ��ttle die- cont�;!.�;;d the
weakest be sacrificed to the strongest.
It is now in the power of the states to form a continental government as .effica-cious as the interior government of any par-ticular state.
The general concerns of the continent may be reduced to a few heads; but in all the affairs that respect the whole, Congress
must have the same power to enact laws and compel obedience throughout the con-tinent as the legislatures of the several states have in their respective jurisdictions. If Con-gless have any power, they must have the whole power of the continent. Such a pow-er would not abridge the sovereignty of each state· in any article relating to its own government. The internal police of each state would be still under the sole ·superin-tendence of its legislature. But in a matter that equally respects all the states, no indi-vidual s_tate has more than a thirteenth part of the legislative authority, and consequent-ly has no right to decide what measure shall or shaU not take place on the continent. A m_ajority of the states must decide; our con-federation cannot be permanent unless founded on that principle; nay more, the states cannot be said to be united till such a
, • principle is adopted in ifr utmost latitude. If a single town or precinct ·could counteract the will of a whole state, would there be any government in that state? It is an estab-lished principle in government that the wilI of the minority must submit to that of the majority; and a sirigle state or a minority of states ought to be disabled to resist the will of the majority, as much as a town or coun-ty in any state is disabled to prevent the execution of a statute law of the legislature.
It is on this principle and this alone that a free state can be gov_erned; it is on this principle. alone that the American states can exist as a confederacy of republics. Either the several states must continue separate, totally independent of each other, and liable to all the evils of jealousy, dispute, and civil dissension – nay, liable to a civil war upon any clashing of interests – or they must constitute a general head, composed of rep-resentatives from all the states, and vested with the power of the whole continent to enforce their decisions. There is no other al-ternative. One of these events must inevita-bly take place, and the revolution of a few years will verify the prediction.
I know the objections that have been urged by the supporters of faction, and per-haps by some honest men, against such a power at the head of the states. But the objections all arise from false notions of government or from a willful design to em-broil the states. Many people, I doubt not, really suppose that such power in Congress would be dangerous to the liberties of the states. Such ought to be enlightened.
There are two fundamental errors, very common in the reasonings which I have heard on the powers of Congress. The first arises from the idea that our American Con-stitutions are founded on principles simil/r, to those of the European governmen� which have been called free. Hence people are led into a second error, which is that Congress are a body independent of their constituents and under the influence of a distinct interest.
But we have seen before that our systems
of civil government are different from all others, founded on different principles, more favorable to freedom, and more secure against oorruption.
We have no eeri,.etual distinctions of prope:;r which might raise one class of mefl””””�bove another �nd create powerful family connections and combinations against our liberties. We suffer no hereditary offices or titles which might breed insolence and pride and give their possessors an opportu-nity to oppress their fellowmen. We are not u��:l1h�<:!i!’.\’£JioQ,.£L� big2,te� clergy ;i;;;
might rob us of the means of knowledge
and then inculcate on credulous minds what sentiments they please. Not a single office or emolument in America is held by pre-scription or hereditaty right; but all at the disposal of the people,. and not a man on the continent but.”drones and villains who has not the privilege of frequently choosing his legislators and impeaching his magis-trates for maladministration. Such principles form the basis of our American govern-· inents – the first and only governments on
earth that are founded on the true principles of equal liberty and properly guarded from
1 sorruption.
� The legislarures of the American states are the onl:p- legislatures on earth which are wholly dependent on the people at large; and Congress is as dependent on the several states as the legislatures are on their constit-uents. The members of Congress are chosen by the legislatures, removable by them at pleasure, dependent on them for subsis-tence, and responsible- to their constituents
- •1 . for their conduct. But this is not all. After having been delegated three years, the con-federation renders them ineligible for the term of three years more, when they must return, mingle with the people, and become
private citizens. At the same time, their in-
- terest is the same with that of the people; for enjoying no exclusive privileges but what are temporary they cannot knowingly enact oppressive laws, because they involve themselves, their families, and estates in all
the mischiefs that result from such laws.
People, therefore, who attempt to terrify us with apprehensions of losing our liberties because other states have lost theirs, betray an ignorance of histof)!i and of the principles of our confederation.::) will not undertake to say that the government of the American states will not be corrupted or degenerate into tyranny. But I venture to assert that if it should, it will be the fault of the people. If the people continue to choose their rep-resentatives annually and the choice of dele-gates to Congress should remain upon its present footing, that body can never be-come tyrants. A measure partially oppres-sive may be resolved upon, but while the principles of representation, which are al-ways in the power of the people, remain uncorrupted, such a measure can be of no long continuance. The best constitution of government may degenerate from its purity through a variety of causes; but the confed-eration of these states is better secured than
any government on earth, and less liable to corruption from any quarter.
There is the same danger that the consti-tutions of the several states will become ty-rannical as that the principles of federal government will be corrupted. The states in their collective capacity have no more rea-son to dread an uncontrollable power in Congress than they have, in their individual capacity, to dread the uncontrollable power of their own legislatures. Their security in both instances is an equal representation, the dependence, the responsibility, and the rotation of their representat.ives. These arti-cles constitute the basis of our liberties, and will be an effectual security, so long as the people are wise enough to maintain the principles of the confederation.
I beg leave here to observe that a state was never yet destroyed by a corrupt or a wicked administration. Weakness and wick-edness in the executive department may produce innumerable evils; but so long as the principles of a constitution remain un-corrupted, their vigor will always restore good order. Every stride of tyranny in the best governments in Europe has been effect-ed by breaking over some constitutional barriers. But ·where a constitution is .formed by the people and unchangeable but by their authority, the progress of corruption must be extremely slow, and perhaps tyran-ny can never be established in such govern-ment, except upon a general habit of indo-lence and vice.
What do the states obtain by reserving to themselves the right of deciding on the pro-priety of the resolutions of Congress? The great advantage of having every measure defeated, our frontiers exposed to savages, the debts of the states unpaid and accumu-lating, national faith violated, commerce re-stricted and insulted, one state filching some interest from another, and the whole body linked together by cobwebs and shadows, the jest and the ridicule of the world. This is not a chimerical description; it is a literal
representation of facts as they now exist. One state found it could make some advan-tages by refusing the impost. Congress have reasbned with their legislature,-·and by in-controvertible. proofs have pointed out the. ig1propriety of the refusal,. but all to no purpose. Thus one-fiftieth part of the states counteracts a measure. that the other states suppose not only beneficial but necessary; a measure on which the discharge of our pub-lic debt .and 9ur national faith most obvi-ously .depend. Can a government thus feeble and.disjointed answer any valuable purpose? Can commutative justice between the states ever be obtained?.. ·Can public debts be. dis-charged ·a-nd c�edit supported I. Can America ever be respected by her enemies when one of.her own states can, year after year, abuse her weakness with impunity? No, the American states, so celebrated for their wis-dom and valor in the late struggle for free-dom and empire, will be the contempt of nations unless they can unite their force and carry into effect all the constitutional mea-sures of Congress, whether those n::ieasures ‘respect themselves or foreign nations:·.
The Articles of Confederation .ordain that
the public expenses shall be defrayed out of
a common treasury. But where .is this trea-
sury? Congress prescribe a measure for sup-plying this treasury; but the states do not approve of the measure; each state will take its own way and its own time, and perhaps not supply its contingent of money at alL ‘Is this an adherence·to the Articles of our U11-ionf It certainly is not; and the states that refuse a compliance with the general mea-sures of the continent would, under a good government, be considered as rebels. Such a conduct amounts to treason, for it strikes at the foundation of government.
Permit me to ask every candid American how society could exist if every man as-sumed the right of sacrificing his neighbor’s property to his own interest? Are there no
- ..rightsto be relinquished, no sacrifices to be
- !made for the sake of enjoying the benefits
of civil government? If every town in Rhode Island, even the smallest, could anni-hilate every act of the legislature, could that state exist? Were such a selfish system to prevail generally, there would be an end of government and civil society would become a curse. A social state would be less eligible than a savage state, in proportion as knowl-edge would be increased and knaves multi-plied. Local inconveniences and local .inter, ests never ought to disappoint a measure of general utility. If there is not power enough in government to remedy these evils by obliging private interests to give way to public, discord will pervade the state, and terminate in a revolution. Such a power must exist somewhere, and if people will quarrel with good government, there are in-numerable opportunities for some daring ambitious genius to erect a monarchy on\ civil dissensions. In America there is no·. danger of an aristocracy; but the transition from popular anarchy to monarchy is very natural and often very easy. If these states have any change of government to fear, it is a monarchy. Nothing but the creation of a sovereign power over the whole, with au-thority to compel obedience to legal mea-sures, can ever prevent a revolution in favor
of one monarchy or more. This event may ,, be distant, but is not the less certain. Amer- �l ica has it now in her power to create a su-preme power over the whole continent suf-ficient to answer all the ends of government without abridging the rights or destroying the sovereignty of a single state. But should the extreme jealousy of the states prevent the lodgment of such a power in a body of men chosen by themselves and removable at pleasure, such a .power will inevitably create itself in the cours.e of events.
Th� confederation has sketched .out a most excellent form of continental govern-ment. The ninth article recites the powers of Congress, which are perhaps nearly suffi-cient to answer the ends of our Union, were there any method of enforcing their
resolutions. It is there said what powers shall be exercised by Congress; but no pen-alty is annexed to disobedience. What pur-pose would the laws of a state answer if they rii’ight be evaded with impunity? And if there were no penalty annexed to a breach of them? A law without a penalty is mere advice; a magistrate without the power of punishing is a cipher. Here is the great defect in the articles of our federal govern-ment. Unless Congress can be vested with the same authority to compel obedience to their resolutions that a legislature in any state has to enforce obedience to the laws of that state, the existence of such a body is
. entirely needless and will not be of long duration. I repeat what I have before said. The idea of governing thirteen states and uniting their interests by mere resolves and recommendations, without any penalty an-nexed to a noncompliance, is a ridiculous farce, a burlesque on government, and a re-proach to America.
Let Congress be empowered to call forth the force of the continent, if necessary, to carry into effect those measures which they have a right to frame. Let the president be, ex officio1 supreme magistrate, clothed with authority to execute the laws of Congress, in the same manner as the governors of the states are to execute the laws of the states.
Let the superintendent of finance have the power of receiving the public monies and issuing warrants for collection in the man-ner the treasurer has in Connecticut. Let ev-ery executive officer have power to enforce
the laws which fall within his province. At the ·same time, let them be accountable for their administration. Let penalties be an-nexed to every species of inaladni.inistration and exacted with such rigor as is due to jus-tice and the public safety. In short, let the whole system of legislation be the peculiar right of the delegates in Congress who are always under the control of the people; and let the whole administration be vested in magistr�tes as few as possible in number, and subject to the control of Congress only. Let every precaution be used in framing laws, but let no part of the subjects be able to resist the execution. Let the people keep, and forever keep, the sole right of legislation in their own representatives, but divest themselves wholly of any right to the ad-ministration. Let every state reserve its sov-ereign right of directing its own internal af-. fairs, but giie to Congress the sole right of conducting the general affairs of the conti-nent. Such a plan of government is practica-ble.; and, I believe, the only plan that will preserve the faith, the dignity,· and the union of these American states.
Public domain. Source: Sketches of American Policy, 1785.[Harry R. Warfel, ed., New York, 1937, pp. 3-48]